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Within the Department of Defense, funds are appropriated and budget authority is issued; 
resources are then executed accordingly. However, higher priority adjustments occur due 
to unintended and looming threats and needs. The abilities granted through the use of 
reprogramming allow for the shifting of funds within and among programs. Thus, service 
effectiveness in the execution of funding can be enhanced or reduced by the latitude 
granted to the defense department in its ability to reprogram funds.  
Several methods of analysis, such as the measures of central tendency and the 
measures of dispersion, are applied supportive of reprogramming effectiveness. Through 
these methods this thesis tests the Marine Corps’ effectiveness in its role of budgetary 
execution through the use of reprogramming activities for a 10-year period from 2005 to 
2014. In order to properly compare and contrast reprogramming actions, data 
encompassing the entire DOD was gathered. Results show that Marine Corps 
reprogramming, much like the DOD, is on a downward trend although displaying varying 
results across major defense appropriations and between the services. Effectiveness traces 
the same line and remains relative to the overall decline of the budget authority. 
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Reprogramming is the process of adjusting appropriated funds from their 
originally budgeted use. In a time of scarce resources, managing resources is critical to 
providing for the strategic defense of the nation and to ensuring local and foreign 
operations continue. Reprogramming results from the unplanned and unforeseen events 
such as war and conflicts, natural disasters, adjustments in cost estimations, and 
adjustments in priorities. The ability to shift funds provides for the flexibility to revise 
current programs to be effective and better suited for higher priority occurrences. 
Examples of reprogramming may be seen in variety of unplanned and unforeseen 
events as related to in the next two cases. In September 2012, 15-armed insurgents 
breached the perimeter of a British forward operating base in Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. 
Next to Camp Bastion is Camp Leatherneck, home, at the time, to the 1st Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF) forward. A Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier squadron lay in 
wait on the flight line for the attacking insurgents. Marines sprung into a counter defense, 
eventually shuttering the attackers. Battle damage assessments were conducted; before 
the 15 insurgents were defeated two Marines were fatally injured with nine other U.S. 
personnel wounded. In addition, six harriers were destroyed and significant damage was 
sustained to two other harriers, an unforeseen incident resulting from war in Afghanistan. 
Later a prior approval (PA) reprogramming action was initiated and was submitted to 
Congress in September 2014 in order to replace the six destroyed harriers. In their place 
the PA requested six Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F-35B, short takeoff and vertical landing 
(STOVL) aircraft for a total of $880,453,000 (Prior Approval 14-13, OUSD [C], 2014). It 
would appear Congress would approve the request considering the harrier fleet is near the 
end of its useful life and plans are underway to retire the aging aircraft at the end of 2014 
with the JSF. It can be considered that the request was an effective use of the authority to 
reprogram funds due to war losses however the request was denied.  
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The next example began in August of 2005 when a category five hurricane struck 
the Gulf Coast causing major damage and leaving many people in the southern United 
States without shelter. In conjunction with federal agencies such as Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), specific military units were called in to help with the 
devastation left behind. These unforeseeable and unbudgeted natural disasters required 
the shifting of previously appropriated funds for a different purpose. In this case, funds 
previously budgeted and appropriated for were needed to fund military units for the 
disaster relief operations most characteristically associated with search and rescue and 
medical care. In the following years numerous reprogramming actions were submitted for 
approval by various military services. 
One of the principal objectives of management is to effectively operate and 
control resources necessary to achieve organizational objectives. Effectiveness has many 
different variations based on situational context. In the military, effectiveness can be 
identified by having proper effects on a target or multiple targets using indirect artillery, 
through naval bombardment and through effective communication within command and 
control. On the other hand, effectiveness can be defined by way of the business 
management approach. In business management effectiveness is defined at the point at 
which an objective can be designated complete, by achieving the most value for the least 
cost. Reprogramming effectiveness can only be determined by a comprehensive 
examination of the data and developing conceptual conclusions.  
This thesis seeks to understand the effectiveness to which the United States 
Marine Corps executes its funding through the use of budgetary reprogramming. This 
thesis begins with a historical review of the past ten years, specifically 2005 to 2014, of 
Department of Defense (DOD) reprogramming. Comparisons are employed exercising 
both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Qualitative methods include an activity 
systems map or also referred to as a process systems map along with historical relevance 
to reprogramming increases and decreases. Quantitative methods include descriptive 




Before we continue through the analysis of the past ten years of Marine Corps 
reprogramming it is important to lay the foundation or groundwork that facilitates 
reprogramming within the DOD. First, a brief summary of the budgetary process is 
presented, followed by a brief overview of the fiscal boundaries the Marine Corps 
operates within; encompassed by the budget authority (BA) granted to the Department of 
the Navy (DON). Next, a look at the definition of reprogramming, its categories and 
types will be provided along with the legislation and regulations backing the use and 
authorization to reprogram funds. Finally, this section will look at reprogramming’s 
importance in the fiscal execution of defense budgets. 
1. Budget Process 
The defense department’s budgetary process, known as the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system, is made up of four distinct but 
overlapping phases or cycles. Depending on the time of year, three budgets are being 
managed; one of which is the execution of the current fiscal year (FY), while defending 
the next FY budget requests, and while also developing further FY budget requests 
(Brook, 2014).  
Planning, programming, and budgeting are all a part of the creation of a defense 
budget while the sole purpose of the execution phase is to properly, efficiently, and 
effectively exercise the programs and guidance set forth in the budget estimate 
submission (BES) and programming objective memorandum (POM). It is the execution 
of the budget at the programmatic level that provides the military capability to operate at 
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Since planning, programming, and 
budgeting are underway so far in advance of the execution phase, a defensible budget 
requires assessment, analysis, and adjustment. It is in the final phase, execution that we 
see the use of reprogramming and transfers (Tyszkiewicz and Daggett ,1998).  
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2. Marine Corps Fiscal Landscape within the Department of the Navy 
This section will take a glance at the budget authority granted to DON and more 
importantly impacting this thesis is the BA granted to the Marine Corps within the DON.  
a. Department of the Navy Budget 
The Department of the Navy (DON) budget is comprised of both the Navy, blue 
money, and Marine Corps budget, green dollars, while the Marine Corps budget is vastly 
reduced in comparison. Carrying a nominal average budget authority of just over $143 
billion, DON’s budget trends upward but tapers off starting in FY 2011 and falls 
dramatically in 2013, predominantly due to budget cuts and sequestration. Fiscal year 
2014 had a slight increase of funding from the prior fiscal year. Figure 1 illustrates 
DON’s total BA portrayed in current dollars versus real FY 15 dollar figures, and also 
includes the Marine Corps BA for the most recent 15 years. Figures were drawn from the 
DON Budget Databook for FY 2015.  
Additionally, Figures 1 through 3 incorporate the totals of the congressional base 
for DON and include defense supplemental appropriation amounts added throughout all 
the fiscal years illustrated. 
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Figure 1.  DON Funding (after Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
[Financial Management and Comptroller], 2015) 
On average, with a high of just over $38 billion in FY 09 and a low of $17.7 
billion, the Marine Corps represents 18.8 percent of DON budget. Observing real dollars, 
funding has decreased from FY 05 to FY 14 by 8.3 percent. However, with the exception 
of fiscal years 2005 to 2008, funding increased at a relative constant rate, steadied for a 
few years and began to fall much like the DON BA (Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy [Financial Management and Comptroller], 2015) 
Carrying a nominal average of $22.5 billion, funded levels remained continuous 
from FY 2008 to 2011, and then began to decrease throughout the remaining fiscal years. 
The start of a steady increase in overall funding can be pinpointed to the increase in 
procurement levels beginning in FY 07, alternatively procurement levels have 
dramatically fallen over the remaining appropriations leading to FY 14. Figure 2 
demonstrates the relative and absolute distributions in major appropriation title levels. 
Starting with the y-axis working from FY 05 up to FY 14 and on the x-axis real 
(constant) FY 14 dollars in millions.  
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Figure 2.  USMC Major Appropriations 2005-2014 (after Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense [Comptroller], 2014a) 
Budget authority for active military personnel, referred to as military personnel 
Marine Corps (MPMC), on average represents the majority of the Marine Corps budget 
with operation and maintenance Marine Corps (OMMC) representing the second largest 
percentage.  
Figure 3 presents the ten-year average percentages for Marine Corps major 
appropriations. Throughout Figures 2 and 3, the reserve funding for military personnel 
and O&M represent a relatively small percentage of the Marine Corps budget. This is due 




Figure 3.  Ten-Year Average for Marine Corps Major Appropriations FY05-14 
(after Office of the Under Secretary of Defense [Comptroller], 2014a) 
3. Reprogramming and transfers 
To identify reprogramming actions we will define transfers as the shifting of 
funds from one category of appropriation(s) to another appropriation(s) for a purpose 
other than budgeted. On the other hand, reprogramming is specifically the shifting of 
funds within appropriations. DOD uses the term reprogramming to refer to both transfers 
and reprogramming (Christensen, 2012). Both transfers and reprogramming allow for 
statutory latitude to make adjustments based on unforeseen requirements for not only the 
DOD but also other organizations or departments entirely or partially funded by the U.S. 
government. Within the DOD and its services, reprogramming occurs to fund higher 
priority items/events that were not previously budgeted for, which become essential for 
the defense of national interests (Tyszkiewicz and Dagget, 1998). However, there are 
specific regulations regarding the use of such privileges. 
a. Legislation and Regulation 
The contextual legal authority to transfer/reprogram congressionally approved 
defense dollars is located in two separate types of documents; the first document is 
through congressional legislation and the second by Department of Defense (DOD) 
regulations. Thus it is fitting that congressional approved defense dollars have 
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congressionally approved procedures for reprogramming actions. Legislative documents 
contain specific information as to the limitations of transfers/reprogramming authority 
granted to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). Details concerning defense reprogramming 
can currently be found in Public Law 113-76 (House Resolution [HR] 3547): 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, signed January 17, 2014. And throughout Public 
Law 113-66 (HR 3304): National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2014, signed 
December 26, 2013.  
In addition, DOD regulations enable reprogramming activities within the services. 
Two regulations effecting reprogramming are the DOD Financial Management 
Regulation Volume 3, Chapter 6: Reprogramming of DOD Appropriated funds (DOD 
7000.14-R, dated March 2011) (OUSD [C], 2012b), and DON Office of the Secretary of 
the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) (OSN [FM&C]) Financial 
Management Policy Manual, NAVSO P-1000 revised through change 67, 12 December, 
2012 (OSN [FM&C], 2012). Typically, when Congress adjusts reprogramming specifics, 
DOD would adjust their regulations thereby providing consistency in Congress. The 
DON regulation or instruction is specific to the Department of the Navy and thereby 
specific to the Marine Corps. 
b. Categories and Types 
Within the execution phase of defense budgeting, reprogramming is divided into 
two distinctive categories. Each category of reprogramming consists of a designated 
purpose and carries with it specific requirements. The first type of reprogramming is 
usually referred to as above threshold reprogramming and includes prior approval (PA), 
internal reprogramming (IR), and letter transfers (also called notification letters). The 
second category includes only one type of reprogramming referred to as below threshold 
reprogramming. 
(1) Prior Approval 
Prior approvals consist of those actions that specifically require congressional 
approval prior to implementation. Certain benchmarks cause the prior approval request(s) 
to be initiated. Those benchmarks may include increases in the quantities of a major end 
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item(s), certain appropriations and programs having direct congressional special interest, 
new start programs, and the program termination both costing more than $20 million or 
more in procurement or $10 million or more in research, development, test, and 
evaluation (RDT&E). As an example of a termination, due to many problems with the $3 
billion dollar expeditionary fight vehicle (EFV) (Feickert, 2014), which caused massive 
costs overruns, the program was terminated causing a prior approval (FY 12-14 PA, 
OUSD [C], 2012). If funds affecting special interest items are needed for another 
purpose, then prior approval is necessary. The following are additional criteria for 
triggering prior approval request.  
 Military personnel—total increase of $10 million or more if a budget 
activity 
 Operation and maintenance—total cumulative increase of $15 million or 
more of a budget activity, or depot maintenance group 
 Procurement—total increase of $10 million or more in line item; or 
decrease in $10 million or more, or 20 percent of appropriated, whichever 
is larger  
 RDT&E—total increase of $4 million or more in a program; or decrease in 
$10 million or more, or 20 percent of appropriated, whichever is larger 
 
(2) Internal Reprogramming 
Internal reprogramming are those actions that do not meet the thresholds of prior 
approval reprogramming and do not alter funds with congressional intent. Additionally 
internal reprogramming may be used to shift funds from transfer accounts, such as the 
Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Mine Resistant Ambush Protection Vehicle Fund, and the 
Iraqi Freedom Fund. Transfer accounts are usually maintained by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and are those accounts that are used as a central location to 
house the funds until they are needed for the intended executable purpose.  
(3) Congressional Letter Transfer Reprogramming 
Congressional notifications are those actions that fall below prior approval 
reprogramming criteria for new programs or line items. Congressional letter 
reprogramming includes:  
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 New—procurement total cost less than $20 million; RDT&E program 
costing less than $10 million 
 Terminations—procurement program costing less than $20 million; 
RDT&E program costing less than $10 million 
 Safety modifications—total cost for either procurement or RDT&E of less 
then $20 million 
 
(4) Below Threshold Reprogramming 
Below threshold reprogramming (BTR) is used for relatively minor adjustments 
and are still required to be reported via the Report of Programs, DD 1416 congressionally 
required semi-annually in aggregate, but are reported quarterly via standard operating 
procedures in the DOD. This report assembles the approved programs as enacted, 
reprogramming actions previously approved, undistributed transfers and amounts, and 
those funds that have been reprogrammed by the services using BTR authority. Typically, 
BTRs are considered outcomes that shift less than $15 million in O&M, $20 million or 20 
percent of procurement line item, and $10 million or 20 percent of RDT&E program 
elements. This form of reprogramming does not change congressional special interest 
items, does not use general transfer authority, or does not terminate or initiate new starts. 
4. Importance  
Based on agreements with congressional committees and DOD, reprogramming 
allows the military to meet needs in the defense of the nation due to changing external 
threats. It authorizes the DOD flexibility in the execution of its budget and provides 
congressional control and supervision. Reprogramming may be only one of many other 
categories within the execution phase of the PPBE system, still it contains relatively large 
monetary amounts that have legal, strategic and operational implications. Table 1 lists the 
totals for reprogramming for fiscal years (FY) 2005 to 2014. As an example, 
reprogramming has a very large monetary affect on DOD operations and national 
interests. Over a period of ten years, increases in both prior approval and internal 
reprogramming actions combined for nearly a total of $235 billion in current (nominal) 
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dollars. Additionally, nearly 9.5 thousand lines of items (appropriation) were either 
increased or decreased.  
 
Table 1.   Total DOD Reprogramming Values (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
Totals FY 2005 - 2014 
Number of Reprogramming Actions 775 
Number of Reprogramming Transactions 9,420 
Dollar Value of Reprogramming Actions (bill) $234.69 
 
Throughout this thesis we refer to increases as those reprogramming transactions 
requiring additional funding. While decreases are those reprogramming transactions from 
were internally allocated funding originates to cover required increases. More detail into 
the realm of reprogramming will be systematically discussed throughout Chapters IV and 
V. 
C. LIMITATIONS 
In gathering the data for this thesis it became evident that compiling every 
reprogramming transaction over the last ten years would be a trying issue. Given that the 
Marine Corps is not an independent service, falling under the Department of the Navy, it 
was problematic to draw out every particular specific reprogramming occurrence. Unless 
specifically stated in the documentation whether a reprogramming action(s)/transaction(s) 
affected a Marine Corps program, it was excluded from the Marine Corps data figures 
however still included in Navy figures. For example, the Marine Corps does not control 
its own major appropriations for aircraft procurement, weapons procurement for aircraft, 
military construction, or RDT&E. To add to the limitations not every justification 
specified whether reprogramming increases or decreases affected Marine Corps assets or 
programs, however they possibly could have. Some of these shared appropriations are 
discussed in the section on blue in support of green (BISOG). For consistency in 
evaluation, the following list of appropriations was not included in determining Marine 
Corps reprogramming effectiveness. 
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 Navy Aircraft Procurement (APN) 
 Navy weapons procurement (WPN) 
 Navy research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) 
 Procurement of ammunition, Navy and Marine Corps (PANMC) 
 Military construction (MILCON) 
 Family housing construction  
 Family housing operations 
 Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)  
 
Only green specific appropriations were analyzed and used in the performance of 
this thesis for the Marine Corps. Finally, only prior approval (PA) and internal 
reprogramming (IR) actions were gathered and examined for the purposes of this thesis. 
Below thresholds reprogramming and letter reprogramming were not included. Letter 
reprogramming contained no specific or indirect justification linking Marine Corps 
funding, while below threshold reprogramming contained inconsistent data from one 
quarter to the next. 
D. PROBLEM 
 In the era of sequestration, the allocation of scarce resources may impede goal of 
management goals. Understanding the future needs of national defense allows the Marine 
Corps to assess budgetary decisions, assess the execution of programmatic actions, and 
adjust the POM/BES to better suit this need. Reprogramming allows resources to be 
moved within and among programs due to adjustments in impending threats and needs. 
Thus, service effectiveness in the execution of funding can be enhanced or reduced by the 
latitude granted to the defense department in its ability to reprogram funds.  
E. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Primary research question: What is the Marine Corps effectiveness of 
reprogramming actions in relation to the fiscally constrained budget? 
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Secondary research questions: Would an analysis of statistical data, dispersion, 
magnitude, frequency of reprogramming actions allow for conclusions to be drawn in 
order to affect the budgetary process within the Marine Corps?  
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II begins with the foundation for this thesis. The chapter surveys the 
literature. The chapter is focused on the prior literature, providing an evaluation and a 
framework for this study. The literature and research detailed below provides an over-
arching yet progressive understanding and baseline into the broad scope of not only 
reprogramming but also the broader area of the defense budgetary process.  
Chapter III provides the overview of methodology guiding the analysis for which 
reprogramming occurs. This chapter will provide the primary techniques and methods of 
empirical analysis to be used and applied in order to formulate a thorough understanding 
of the complex nature of reprogramming effectiveness spanning ten years. In addition the 
methods entail descriptive statistics through the measures of central tendency, along with 
measures of dispersion, and finally through frequency distributions.  
Chapter IV begins with a consideration of why reprogramming occurs. Why it 
exists in the execution of defense budgets. The chapter presents assumptions based on the 
examination and analysis of the services reprogramming actions. Detail is revealed 
concerning the DOD as a whole and certain information revealed concerning other 
services. 
Chapter V presents the finding and conclusions from the investigation into the 
effectiveness of both the DOD and particularly the Marine Corps reprogramming. It will 
conclude with suggestions for further research and study. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BOOKS AND SCHOLARLY RESEARCH 
Books and analytical research, spanning nearly 40 years, provided the guidance, 
foundation, and framework for this thesis. As stated in the previous chapter 
transfers/reprogramming are a subset of the broad and detailed process of the PPBE 
system, specifically the execution of appropriated funds through defense appropriations 
acts. To frame this literature review, we begin with Fisher’s (1975) work on the historical 
developments that led to the establishment of congressional oversight on defense 
reprogramming. Jones and Bixler (1992) along with Jones, Candreva, and DeVore (2012) 
continue where Fisher left off and present evidence on the changes in reprogramming and 
transfers.  
1. Presidential Spending Power  
Fisher (1975) sets the qualitative historical groundwork upon how and why 
reprogramming was formulated into congressional oversight. He provides an in-depth 
case analysis of particular events in the legislature and National Defense. Fisher 
examines the notion that the term “reprogramming” did not emerge in government or 
defense terminology until the mid-1950s. Papers and articles put forth recommendations 
as to how congress should implement strategies for control and execution of monetary 
appropriations. During World War II, the execution of shifts in funding surfaced as a 
gentlemen’s agreement. Essentially, the War Department was required to notify Congress 
in the event funds were required for use outside of their budgetary plan, due to the war 
(Fisher, 1975).  
Most national, state, and local policies are drawn from significant events in our 
past that were not deemed as suitable to societal norms. The “power of the purse” set 
forth in the United States Constitution (Article I Section 8) sets actions that allow 
congressional oversight. Fisher (1975) contains both a general set of principles and 
examples of non-military references to reprogramming, eliminating any representation of 
bias in the form of military examples alone.  
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Fisher (1975) provides many examples where the military itself was at fault for 
the development of stringent reprogramming mandates. Specifying in the early formation 
of reprogramming rules, on occasion a reprogramming action would occur that broke or 
bent the agreed upon rules. Fisher details his first reason for reprogramming as 
“bypassing the congress,” a form of simply avoiding Congress all together thus avoiding 
the authorization and appropriations process. All the service department would have to do 
is receive positive endorsement from a sub-committee in the form of a reprogramming 
action. A second “ace in the hole” argument for rule bending on the part of DOD 
concerns an area where Congress has been inconclusive in coming to a resolution on a 
funding issue years earlier. Military services see this as an emergency reprogramming 
request and immediately receive an affirmative validation. In the third example “undoing 
the work of Congress” the author starts with the services using regular appropriations as a 
means to maneuver around an appropriation that was originally reduced by members of 
Congress. DOD would then get a portion or the entire reduced amount approved through 
reprogramming.  
An alternative position is presented in the form of “circumventing thresholds” 
(Fisher, 1975). “Circumventing thresholds”, can be described as a form of piece-meal, 
where established limits are avoided by the use of multiple reprogramming actions. A 
fourth illustration is presented as “new starts” and can implicitly be explained as the use 
of reprogramming to start a new program. The final pattern or example is in the form of 
“risk taking.” Fisher proposes that when a defense organization is submitting, for instance 
a prior approval reprogramming request, the service department is admitting to an 
element of risk or failure of budget execution. He provides three reasons for the 
acceptance of fault; the first is that the prior approved and funded program was over 
budget. Second, is the admission of a mistake within a current program(s). Finally, the 
original program has been placed at a lower priority over a new program that was not 
budgeted for in DOD’s program objective memorandum (POM) submission to the 
Secretary of Defense and inevitably to the President. All three have lasting consequences 
on the part of the Defense Department in that Congress can take control and mandate a 
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program move funds or have programs cancelled, based on reprogramming actions 
(Fisher, 1975). 
2. Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management, Volume 5, 
Mission Financing to Realign National Defense 
Formulating a continuation of the extraordinary arena of reprogramming Jones 
and Bixler’s (1992) work analyzes reprogramming from 1968 to 1990 in the sense of 
congressional controls within the defense budget. It explains the contextual nature of 
reprogramming and how it has won many arguments for how congress budgetarily 
controls the defense department through restrictions. Continuing in some degree where 
Fisher (1975) left off concerning the historical development of the regulations regarding 
the process of shifting funds, Jones and Bixler (1992) present evidence from a 
congressional house report from 1956. The quoted report within Jones and Bixler’s 
(1992) work simply states that the services have in the past been allowed to have an 
unrestricted ability to shift appropriated funds without informing Congress. Congress 
then changed their stance on reprogramming due to increased pressures to control the 
execution of defense budgets. Unrestricted access to shift funds is in essence eliminated 
leading the defense department to effectively substantiate reprogramming actions, 
consequently conveying congressional scrutiny.  
Another prime point of Jones and Bixler’s (1992) work is the link between the 
notions of why requests are made for the reprogramming of funds. The authors present 
five examples of why reprogramming emerges. These are changes in the operational 
environment, adjustments in estimates, unforeseen matters, adjustments in rates and 
finally succeeding appropriations. By developing a more thorough assessment as to the 
reasons of why reprogramming occurs, one can begin to understand both systematically 
at the macro and micro levels of why reprogramming is needed today.  
3. Financing National Defense, Policy and Process 
Jones, Candreva, and DeVore (2012) present the historical establishment of the 
PPBE system by overlaying the reforms that led the way for what the defense department 
has today.  
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The authors state that, “execution is the exercise of authority,” in describing the 
execution phase of the PPBE system implying that execution is completely diverse from 
the first three phases (Jones, Candreva, and DeVore, 2012). The authors provide an 
outline of the goals of the four phases of the PPBE process. Simply stated the goal of 
execution is to effectively implement the policies and programs initiated by the budget. 
Implementation provides the desired military capabilities and thus provides for the next 
years of budget processes.  
Figure 4 provides a visual representation of the DON process known as the blue-
green split (BISOG) as shown in Jones, Candreva, and DeVore (2012). The authors state 
that when using the term direct, it implies that funds come directly from Navy controlled 
appropriations in support of Marine Corps programs. Specifically, Marine Corps aircraft 
are directly funded from Navy controlled major appropriations titled Aircraft 
Procurement. The term indirect in this form applies to programs and operations that if the 
Marine Corps did not exist the Navy would continue to fund Corpsmen and Chaplains 
(Jones et al., 2012). 
 
Figure 4.  Blue Green Split 
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B. STUDIES BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
Government organizations such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
the Congressional Research Service (CRS), and the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) provide an enormous amount of information. More than any other organization, 
the GAO and CRS document, analyze, and perform comprehensive reviews of 
Department of Defense (DOD) appropriations and occasionally investigate and survey 
the subject of reprogramming. Two reports by the GAO assess influence and provide 
evidence of the effects of reprogramming. The first assessment was conducted in 1986 as 
a review of the process of reprogramming in the defense department. The second GAO 
report (1989) disentangles and examines more closely the intrinsic details of the process 
and then provides recommendations for areas of improvement in both DOD and 
Congress. 
1. U.S. General Accounting Office Budget Reprogramming: Department of 
Defense Process for Reprogramming Funds  
The General Accounting Office, now known as the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), upon request, provided Arkansas Senator David Pryor a 
summation of DOD reprogramming actions in 1986 for the period of FY 1981 to 1985. 
The GAO examination and inquiry offers a significant amount of contextual and 
historical information associated with DOD reprogramming in the early 1980s (GAO, 
1986a). This study served as a precursor to future requests made by Congress for analysis 
into the shifting of funds within DOD.  
As stated previously, DOD and the services use transfers and reprogramming 
interchangeably. When DOD and or the services refer to reprogramming they are 
referring to both reprogramming and transfers. Unlike many other studies, reports, and 
military instructions, the 1986 GAO report draws specific separation between transfers 
and reprogramming. The GAO report distinctly brings into context the legal authority 
granting permission to shift funds. The report goes on to state that reprogramming is non-
statutory; that there are no governing guidelines sanctioning reprogramming. Conversely, 
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transfers are statutory in nature whereby general transfer authority is granted to DOD, 
specifically to the Secretary of Defense in the form of annual defense appropriations.  
The GAO report continues by summarizing the reprogramming processes 
involved within the DOD and more specifically the review and approval process 
stipulated by Congress through the use of congressional sub-committees in the House and 
Senate. The report provides a detailed analysis of the actions taken by four congressional 
committees that are normally tied to the process of reprogramming. These four 
committees differ in some aspects as to how a reprogramming action takes place and 
passes (or not) through Congress. In 1980, the four committees were the House 
Committee on Appropriations, Senate Committee on Appropriations, House Committee 
on Armed Services, and the Senate Committee on Armed Services. These committees 
have since changed their names to reflect a more general sense. They are now known 
respectively as the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), Senate Armed Services 
Committee (SASC), House Appropriations Committee (HAC) and finally the Senate 
Appropriations Committee (SAC). The appropriations committees are further broken 
down into sub-committees that have a narrower defense focus. They are the Senate 
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee (SAC-D) and the House Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittee (HAC-D).  
Quite interestingly, the report provides answers to concerns by Senator Pryor as to 
how members of Congress, not on any of the four committees, obtain reprogramming 
information, which could affect their constituents. The GAO (1986) asserts that there is 
no formal manner by which congressional members may receive information or provide 
their input into the DOD reprogramming process. Of course if the area of concern is of 
key interest, the congressman or congresswoman has an informal approach by contacting 
committee members and conveying their agenda or apprehension (GAO, 1986a).  
The GAO report (1986a) provides quantitative evidence in the form of 
reprogramming statistics through fiscal years 1981 to 1985. The GAO begins with 
establishing the total budget authority (BA) authorized to DOD, with gross adjustments 
made over the course of the related fiscal year. The report continues with an examination 
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into further detail of arranging the total gross adjustments and overall line items, both 
additive and adverse, to the congressional BA base, represented by each service.  
2. Budget Reprogramming: Opportunities to Improve DOD’s 
Reprogramming Process  
Upon request, the GAO provided Georgia Senator Sam Nunn, then Chairman on 
the Committee for Armed Services, an abstract of the DOD reprogramming process and 
proposals for improvements. The GAO report was to examine FY 1987 defense 
reprogramming actions and indeed the report reads as a final summary of an inspection 
into defense reprogramming rather than as an account of a quantitative analysis. 
However, unlike other formats of analysis into past performances, the GAO performed its 
analysis simultaneously over FY 1987, as the DOD submitted their request and also into 
the process of congressional review until approval or denial. The report found that from 
1982 through 1987 the DOD submitted an annual average of $3.3 billion (1.3 percent of 
BA) in reprogramming requests, and that each request followed set forth guidelines. The 
analysis depicts the processes involved in the amounts, submission, and reporting of 
reprogramming requests within the DOD and into the review process within Congress 
(GAO, 1989).  
The GAO concluded that DOD followed reprogramming guidelines; however, 
reporting could be improved. Four of GAO’s areas of concern and areas for improvement 
were pointed toward DD Form 1451-1 “Reprogramming Action,” and are outlined as 
follows: (1) Data displayed as summary information, rather than as an amount related 
specifically to affected programs. (2) Identification of the presence of other unresolved 
actions for the same amount not visible. (3) Data on actions not requiring Congressional 
review not displayed. (4) Any amounts that are submitted in the President’s budget are 
not presented. Within the GAO report (1989) the DOD responded (response document 
included in GAO report) in a response letter with partial concurrence. The DOD reflected 
back on the fact that the current agreed upon requirements met established guidelines by 
the committees. Additionally, the DOD responded that some of the suggested reporting 
requirements were unnecessary and could cause additional workloads (GAO, 1989).  
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Along with the DOD findings and responses, the GAO also examined the 
possibility of increasing the dollar threshold amounts for the purpose of reducing 
congressional review workload. The GAO concluded that due to rising budgets and 
increasing inflation costs, an increase in thresholds would only provide a short-term 
solution for a long-term issue (GAO, 1989). Coincidentally, increasing dollar thresholds 
has a relatively small impact on reducing total reprogramming actions. 
C. STUDIES BY THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Studies conducted as part of the master’s thesis program of study from the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) provides the final category of major sources for this literature 
review. A search for theses from educational institutions not affiliated with government 
or the military, regrettably, uncovered no research on the DOD budgetary process or 
defense reprogramming. A thorough examination of theses from NPS was conducted. 
Over the last few decades a small group of students at NPS have studied, analyzed, and 
researched the defense Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) 
system. One thesis attempted to further narrow the subject to DOD reprogramming. That 
thesis by Roum (2007) is a conceptual analysis of the benefits of a specified eight-year 
period from 1999 through 2006. In uncovering defense reprogramming, Roum (2007) 
identifies trends and relationships within DOD reprogramming processes. 
1. The Nature of DOD Reprogramming  
Roum (2007) is a conceptual analysis of the benefits of a specified eight-year 
period from 1999 through 2006 studying prior approval (PA) and internal reprogramming 
(IR) actions. In uncovering defense reprogramming, the author identifies trends and 
relationships within Department of Defense (DOD) reprogramming/transfer processes. 
Roum also describes the historical nature of what has been reprogrammed and how it was 
executed over the eight-year period. Roum’s (2007) thesis incorporates a broad primary 
research claim by attempting to define the nature at which reprogramming occurs, is 
used, and is authorized. Roum’s result is a detailed endeavor to capture the overall trends 
with the process of reprogramming.  
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Roum’s claim and reason are supported by five durable objectives, eliminating 
any view of vagueness in the claim. He leans toward a more specific approach and 
showcases his analysis throughout the thesis (2007). Four of those five objectives lend 
more significantly to this thesis and are stipulated below in a brief overview of the 
supporting objectives, claims and supporting evidence. First, to quantitatively analyze 
reprogramming actions occurring annually and associating the typical dollars involved 
Roum asserts that magnitude and frequency together can show how extensive 
reprogramming occurs annually. He provides a representation of reprogramming actions 
of the FY represented in his thesis laid over the primary budgetary appropriations. 
Second, a determination of when defense reprogramming occurs within an annual period 
is presented. Roum (2007) asserts that when annual defense appropriations are not signed 
or approved before the start of a new fiscal year, a quantitative correlation between 
numbers of reprogramming actions and appropriations may be present. More specifically 
when Congress fails to pass appropriations due to presidential and bipartisan matters, 
reprogramming spikes as a result, which triggers the services attempt to spread the impact 
of failed appropriations affecting defense programs and operations. Roum’s thesis 
provides sound evidence combining previous frequencies of reprogramming associated 
with the timing and amount of supplemental and regularly passed appropriations. 
Next, Roum (2007) identifies the major categories of reprogramming, claiming 
that not all reprogramming actions can differ. There are reprogramming categories that 
require congressional approval and others that do not. This insight and knowledge into 
the categories of reprogramming can assist in a better understanding of the approval 
process. Roum (2007) provides sound evidence by defining the reprogramming 
categories through the DOD’s Financial Management Regulations (2001) as prior 
approval and internal reprogramming actions, concluding that a majority of the 
reprogramed funds were within prior approval shifts. Finally, a description of all defense 
appropriations accounts and frequencies are provided, claiming that this analysis may 
allow high-level military and (or) government leaders to develop policies that determine 
causes of why reprogramming was desirable over budgeting. Four reprogramming years 
were examined, which included the appropriations of O&M, procurement and finally 
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RDT&E, concluding O&M having the greatest increases in dollars moved over the years 
under review. 
Using basic statistical analysis Roum (2007) concludes with four main themes 
associated with his research. First there appears to be distinct seasonal components for 
each category of reprogramming. The seasonal component for internal reprogramming 
(IR) occurs at two points, August to September and March to May. For prior approval 
(PA), seasonal attributes were found primarily in the months of March to May. Roum 
notes that the seasonal timing coincides with mid-year review and the end of the FY. 
Secondly, Roum (2007) does not identify meaningful trends in analyzing the number of 
transactions and dollar amounts in IR actions. The annual amount of funds internally 
reprogrammed was consistently around $15 billion per year. The results for PA actions 
showed a marked increase over the period studied growing at a relatively constant rate 
from $300,000 in 1999 to nearly $8.2 billion over the eight-year examination period. 
Third, in deciphering the major defense appropriations, Roum finds that O&M then 
procurement accounts have the most reprogramming transactions and dollars affected. 
The author hypothesizes that the war in Iraq may have had a causal relationship to the 
significantly higher amounts of reprogrammed funds in the O&M accounts.  
Roum (2007) points out that acquiring the data for manipulation and analysis for 
the study required manually inputting PA and IR actions recommending that a database 
containing all DOD reprogramming would allow for further analysis. Unfortunately, no 





Upon extant literature it became evident that much like Roum’s (2007) thesis 
there is no formally published analytical or scientific approach analyzing reprogramming. 
For this reason, many authors have leaned toward simple yet appealing statistical 
approaches that still have allowed for an in depth study into the shifting of funds. This 
chapter will provide the primary techniques and methods of analysis to be used and 
applied to the complex nature of reprogramming effectiveness. These methods entail 
descriptive statistics through the measures of central tendency, along with measures of 
dispersion, and finally through frequency distributions (Dixon, 2013). These approaches 
will allow for the relationships in the data to be determined, allowing for statistical 
inference to shape the conclusions underlying the analysis. An explanation is also 
provided as to where the data was collected, the sources of the data, how they were 
organized in order to afford an opportunity for the analysis to be conducted, and finally 
the use of constant (real) and current (nominal) dollars. 
1. Measures of Central Tendency 
Making informed decisions or inferences from complex data begins with the basic 
measures of central tendency. The term central tendency can be explained as finding the 
right measure or parameter that fits closely to the center of a given set or sets of data, 
thereby allowing for specific assumptions to be drawn. The three categories of the central 
tendency are the mean, median, and mode. They are three forms of calculating an average 
representative of a set of numbers/data, so that we may infer conclusions of a given set of 
data (Keller, 2009). However, in this thesis, the mode was found ineffective and 
eventually eliminated from the methodology. 
After completing the organization and manipulation of reprogramming actions 
and their respective transactions within a given fiscal year a comparison across fiscal 
years or types of reprogramming can be compared using the two measures of central 
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tendency. These two methods contribute to this thesis two separate calculations each one 
in most cases contributing discernible information and estimates for assessment.  
Table 2 represents the mathematical equations of the population and sample for 
the measures of central tendencies and measures of variation. A brief description of the 
characters used within the equations is provided: 
 Xi = various quantity of a given observation 
 N = number of data points in a population  
 n = number of data point in a sample 
 μ = mu = population mean  
 X  = X bar = sample mean 
 σ = sigma = population standard deviation 
 s = sample standard deviation 
 σ2 = sigma squared = population variance 
 s2 = sample variance 
 




The arithmetic mean in statistical data is the most often used measure of central 
tendency. Most often the mean is chosen in order to represent the central location of a 
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data set. The mean represented as μ, is referred to as the statistical average. It can be 
calculated from a numeric set of data by summing the set of values of the observations as 
the numerator, then dividing by the total number of observations (denominator). The 
mathematical equation for a population mean is given in Table 2. Occasionally, the mean 
does not appropriately describe a set of data and the mode or median is best suited as a 
descriptor. As an example, the median can be used as a measure of central tendency in a 
case when outliers are present within the data resulting in the mean represented as a poor 
fit of central tendency. 
b. Median 
The median is the numerical value separating the upper half of a data set from the 
lower half. By arranging a set of data from least to greatest or vice versa the median can 
be determined after first identifying the middle of the given set of data, sample, or 
population. This measure is useful in determining where a certain observation falls within 
a given data set. When presented with an even set of observations the median can be 
calculated by averaging the individual upper observation nH with the lower observation 
nL. However, like the mean, the median may not be the best choice in formulating an 
inference about a given data set. 
2. Measures of Dispersion 
Through the measures of the range, variance, standard deviation, and the 
coefficient of variation designated as the measures of dispersion or in some cases, the 
measures of variability. These statistical values provide the avenue to determine major 
fluctuations in the irregularity of reprogramming between DOD and the services. 
Primarily, this thesis is concerned with reprogramming conducted by the Marine Corps. 
Other fellow services reprogramming actions can provide a measure to compare how 
effectively the Marine Corps executes its funding. Additionally, the measures of 
dispersion can be used in assessing variability in appropriations when compared to the 
budget authority.  
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a. Range 
The range of a data set is the difference from the highest and smallest 
observations referred to as n. The advantage of the range affords a modest calculation for 
an assessment of distribution of values. The disadvantage of the range arises in the 
following example. In a multiple data, if the highest and lowest observations resemble the 
same values across multiple samples. In this example the range will still be the same 
showing no relative difference in values (range) from one data set to the other, the range 
is then ineffective.  
Previous the median was mentioned as a useful dynamic of the measure of central 
tendency. The median also represents that 50th percentile also referred to as the second 
quartile. The quartile then splits data into quarters such as the 25th and 75th percentile 
equal to the first and second quartile. Additionally the use of the percentile or quartile 
provides a useful means of establishing and referring to location of an observation in 
sample. One last quartile, the interquartile provides the location for the middle 50th 
percentile. Rather it affords a degree of separation or 25 percent spread above and below 
the median. The interquartile is equal to the third quartile minus the first quartile (Keller, 
2009).  
b. Variance 
After calculating and deriving the best-fit number that represents a data set using 
measures of central tendencies we can now extrapolate more in the form of the variance 
referred to as the deviation of data from its mean squared. In calculating the differences 
of reprogramming, a variance will be established between fiscal years, services, and 
appropriations in order to compare and contrast allowing for conclusions to be developed. 
The equations for the variance (both population and sample) are provided in Table 2, but 
the variance can be calculated in the following manner. After calculating the mean, 
subtract the mean from a particular data point, square that difference, sum all the values 
of the squares and divide the total of the squares by the total number of observations. In 
the case of the sample variance, we divide the sum of squares by the total number of 
observations minus by one.  
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c. Standard Deviation 
The standard deviation is more often used in descriptive statistics and is not the 
squared deviation but simply the deviation from the mean. It is calculated as the square 
root of the variance. When interpreting the standard deviation it can be stated that the 
data is plus or minus a certain standard deviation from the mean. The mathematical 
equation for a standard deviation is given in Table 2. The classical rule of thumb to 
follow for the standard deviation is given below (Keller, 2009): 
 68% of the data lies plus or minus one standard deviation from the mean  
 95% of the data lies plus or minus two standard deviation from the mean 
 99.7% of the data lies plus or minus three standard deviation from the 
mean 
When interpreting a sample, consistency can be determined by computing the 
standard deviation to see how far the data set lies from the mean. In the case of 
reprogramming we will compute the standard deviation for each fiscal year and then 
determine how far increases or decreases in approved reprogrammed dollars lie away 
from the mean. The smaller the standard deviation the less spread out the approved 
dollars lie from the average, providing a more consistent look at reprogramming. The 
greater the standard deviation the greater the distance from the mean and conversely the 
result will be inconsistent. 
d. Coefficient of Variation 
The coefficient of variation (CV) also measures the relative size of dispersion 
from the mean however due to the magnitude of most standard deviations it provides a 
better representation for the dispersion. The CV for a single data type aims to describe the 
dispersion of the data in a way that does not depend on the data’s measurement unit. It is 
calculated by dividing the sample standard deviation by the sample mean. Often, the 
result is multiplied by 100. The result implies a plus or minus percentage standard 
deviation away from the mean. The mathematical equation for a coefficient of variation is 
given in Table 2. In interpreting the CV, the smaller the result the less variability in the 
data, while the greater the CV result the more variability. 
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e. Frequency 
Along with the measures of central tendency and measures of dispersion, 
frequency distributions provide the final form of comparison analysis for DOD 
reprogramming. Defense department reprogramming is a complex and informative area 
of study and simply provides a wealth of data. In order to effectively analyze 
reprogramming in a sufficient manner a graphical representation of the data can be used 
to make comparisons across fiscal years, appropriations, appropriations over fiscal years, 
and services. 
Although, quantitative descriptive statistics and analytics will be used throughout 
the analysis portion of this thesis, it is not the only method expended. Other more 
simplistic approaches to scrutinize reprogramming include percentage analysis, 
cumulative dollar figures, and cumulative total actions/transactions of prior approval and 
internal reprogramming versus the services and appropriations, of which most will be 
presented graphically. These secondary quantitative approaches allow for a graphical 
descriptive analysis of the magnitude of reprogramming compared across multiple fiscal 
years and the four services.  
B. DATA 
1. Sources of Data 
In determining Marine Corps effectiveness in reprogramming, data had to be 
collected that was to be found accurate, reliable, and representative of the services. The 
ideal data source on DOD reprogramming was found through the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense, Comptroller (OUSD [C]) unclassified open source website 
containing data from 1999 to present (OUSD [C]). Data from the years 2005 and 2006 
was made available through the data collection previously conducted by Roum’s (2007) 
thesis, which was incorporated into the data after it had been verified and analyzed, while 
additional reprogramming data was collected/gathered from fiscal years 2007 to 2014, 
thereby totaling 10 years of data. Figure 5 displays the information found on the OUSD 
(C) budget execution site; reprogramming action, DD 1415-1 used by the DOD for both 
prior approval (PA) and internal reprogramming (IR) actions, submitted via the 
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services/departments to OSD to the appropriate congressional subcommittee for approval 
or to inform (OUSD [C], 2012b). In this particular, prior approval reprogramming action 
submitted in FY 2011 the Marine Corps transferred an equivalent $10 million between 
two appropriations, O&M to MILPERS reserve. Both categories list their reason as to 
why funds were required and how or why funds were available. As Table 1 described in 
Chapter I, each of the 775 PA or IR actions were comprised of approximately 9,420 
transactions affecting numerous appropriations across and beyond the DOD. Most often 
each action listed required transaction increases in appropriations usually followed by 
decreases in available funds and occasionally followed by further increases and 
decreases, sometimes between services and non-DOD entities.  
It is important to note that reprogramming actions are not meant as a means for a 
balancing act within or between appropriations. Most often reprogramming actions were 
found to have fairly dispersed variances from increases and decreases, however over the 
course of the fiscal year those variances decreased variably in most cases. Variances 
occurred from congressional adjusts/denials, service adjustments prior to the action being 
submitted, or from simply human error. Occasionally, future reprogramming actions were 
used to adjust and readjust previously reprogrammed funds based on forthcoming 
operational and/or resource requirements. However, in other cases the explanations 
linking sources of funds was not straightforward as in Figure 5, for a further example of 
additional reprogramming action see Appendix D. 
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Figure 5.  Prior Approval Reprogramming Request – FY11-27 PA (from 
OUSD[C], 2011) 
In the case of the Marine Corps many circumstances arose that eliminated certain 
data sources. This was due to the Marine Corps being a sister service under the 
Department of the Navy (DON) and due to shared appropriations with the Navy (blue in 
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support of green, [BISOG]) as discussed previously. These reasons eliminated below 
threshold reprogramming (BTR) and letter notification reprogramming, both also found 
within the OUSD (C) open source website. 
Additionally, data source for DOD budgets and funding matters was found and 
gathered through the same OUSD (C) unclassified open source website as previously 
mentioned. Budgetary data was also found through the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB). The OMB source maintains historical tables and data from 1996 to the 
current year. These tables were used to gather and compare differences in discretionary 
defense authorizations, DON budgets and USMC budget figures.  
2. Organization of Data 
Data was gathered, recorded and organized using Microsoft Excel. This allowed 
for the ability to manipulate, organize and present data in an acceptable approach. In the 
case of reprogramming actions, Excel was used in the same manner as in Roum (2007). 
Within the workbook each fiscal year’s reprogramming PA and IR action and its 
transactions were organized noting whether a transaction was a PA or IR, the serial 
number of the action, the date signed, approved, or reviewed, which service the 
individual transaction applied to, the major appropriation title influenced, fiscal year, and 
the transactions affecting minor appropriation title. An additional set of categories 
followed indicating whether the transaction involved overseas contingency operations 
(OCO), new start, or Military Intelligence Program (MIP). In this case, if a transaction 
was either OCO, new start, or MIP a number one referring to a yes or blank referring to a 
no was annotated. 
Subsequently, within the same Excel workbook, each transaction’s increase or 
decrease was gathered and recorded: this included the amount requested along with the 
amount approved. Next, a column calculated the difference in requested and approved 
reprogramming amounts while another column calculated the percentage change in 
requested and approved amounts by dividing the calculated change amount with the 
amount requested.  
 34
As a caveat, determining congressional approval or denial was not the question to 
answer within this thesis. Furthermore, accurately linking increases to their funded 
decreases or vice versa was not possible without further detail.  
3. Inflation 
Inflation occurs in the economy as a result of the fall or rise in the price of goods. 
Inflation within monetary values can be viewed in two distinct aspects. First, the amount 
of buying power an entity possesses is referred to as constant dollars, also stated as real 
dollars, and are values that have been corrected to account for inflation. Second, a 
separable fiscal years budgeted values (current year dollars), also referred to as nominal 
dollars, represent the value at the time received and or obligated (Nussbaum, 2014). 
 In a particular industry, such as the DOD, prices of associated goods rise and fall 
at varying rates. In particular, with the DOD, differences in the armed services and 
between major appropriations are not represented in the same inflationary values. The 
consumer price index (CPI), the standard in converting nominal to real dollars, is not 
useful in accounting for inflation inside the DOD as the CPI adjustments are based on 
labor rates and varying goods that are not associated with the defense industry. For 
instance, state governments do not frequently purchase fighter attack aircraft, tanks, or 
aircraft carriers along with their associated logistic requirements. For these reasons the 
DOD has created the DOD deflator, which represents changes in the price of goods as it 
relates to the DOD, its respective services, and major appropriations. Table 3 represents 
the inflation index of the total DOD deflator, obtained through the National Defense 
Budget estimates for FY 2014, also referred to as the DOD Green Book, for FY 2014 ( 
OUSD [C], 2014a). In order to solve the difficulty of multiple deflators across thousands 
of different reprogramming transactions, and to retain consistency, the total DOD deflator 





Table 3.   DOD Deflator (after Green Book 2014, OUSD [C], 2014a) 












The values represented within the thesis that have been designated as real 
(constant) dollars were calculated by the following formula, real  current
FYdeflator
* 100  . 











This chapter focuses on a detailed examination of the data to assess and infer the 
conclusions stated in this thesis. Starting with the reasons why reprogramming occurs. 
Secondly the analysis chapter offers an explanation of how the data was gathered and 
examined. The analysis concludes with an examination of all prior approval and internal 
reprogramming actions for the ten-year period from 2005 to 2014 for the DOD and the 
Marine Corps. To address Marine Corps effectiveness of reprogramming, it was 
necessary to include data from the other three services and DOD-wide. The data is then 
broken down and presented systematically by comparing services, via budgeted 
appropriations, and budget authority (BA). 
A. REASONS FOR REPROGRAMMING 
It is understandable that unforeseen events occur on a whim and cannot be 
properly budgeted for in any circumstance. Small businesses, companies, corporations, 
industry, military services, DOD, Department of Transportation, Department of Justice, 
Department of Homeland Security, NASA, Congress, and the president to name a few, all 
fall to the misfortunes of events that are not realized early in the development of a 
budget. The reality of budgeting is that the planned budget is not always the absolute 
answer; it is an estimate of spending for a time period that has not occurred. Attempting 
to determine the next threat to America involves chance, uncertainty, and risk. These 
along with scarce resources, cause the necessity to alter the course of budget plans. Carl 
von Clausewitz describes chance as related to war simply as luck and guesswork, “No 
other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up in chance. And through 
the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war” (Howard, 
1976, p. 85). Reprogramming provides the flexibility to execute a congressionally 
approved fiscal budget in order to reduce uncertainty and risk in the midst of 
unforecasted events. There are however many other reasons for reprogramming; Figure 6 
displays a few of those reasons.  
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Figure 6.  Reprogramming Systems Map 
In this thesis, reasons for reprogramming can be broken into eight main areas. 
These eight areas, in no particular order, are war and conflicts, executive and legislative 
pressures, natural disasters, changes in cost estimates, program elimination, new start-
ups, budget reviews, and other. 
Starting with war and conflicts, which can be fought from the sea, air, land or a 
combination of the three, can have multiple effects on a budget. Changes in strategic 
policies have numerous implications to the budget process from how a war or conflict 
will be fought to equipment modernization on the battlefield. As evident in the years 
following an end of past wars, both manpower and equipment spending are greatly 
reduced. This commonly found reduction is not instantaneously achieved. Previous FY 
budgets under execution, which contain funding for appropriations that fall into the 
category of greater than one year, and cannot be simply adapted to the reduction in 
spending. This will become evident in the data presented in the subsequent chapters. 
Executive and/or legislative pressures on Capitol Hill can affect approved 
budgets. These pressures include the end of the year possibility of continuing 











































current sequestration actions. In the introduction of omnibus bills and/or supplemental 
appropriations, services will submit PA or IR reprogramming requests based on the 
possible approval of these large bills and appropriation measures to ensure the suitable 
start to a program. To site an example of reprogramming as a consequence of Omnibus 
bills, supplemental, and political pressures from Washington, in March of 2007 DOD 
submitted a reprogramming request encompassing all services for the procurement of 
mine resistant ambush vehicles (MRAP). The later Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) 
supplemental request included the procurement of MRAPs. The reprogramming action 
was submitted ahead of DOD’s submission of the FY 07 GWOT supplemental request, a 
short-term solution. The sudden procurement of MRAPs in 2007 were the result of first 
the DOD’s failed Combatant Commanders equipment requests, termed joint urgent 
operational needs (JOUN), mixed with the long term needs of the services discovered by 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates (Gates, 2014). Once revealed, Secretary Gates released a 
directive for the immediate procurement of MRAPs making this acquisition the highest 
priority for DOD (Gates, 2014).  
Natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Hurricane Gustav in 2008, 
and the recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014 stirred up multiple reprogramming 
requests for the realignment of funds in response to immediate disaster relief efforts by 
the military services. For instance, in 2005, additional funds were required for the 
evacuation, repairs and other related costs taken on by DOD. In 2014, Army O&M funds 
were decreased by $500 million to fund the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance 
and Civic Aid fund related to the Ebola outbreak. 
New start-up programs much like the MRAP program would encompass multiple 
actions. Over the 10 years covered in this thesis, 31 actions of which 28 IR and 3 PA 
actions would be submitted and ultimately approved for the MRAP program. 
Additionally program elimination such as the EFV, mentioned in Chapter I, emphasizes 
the use/requirement of reprogramming on the part of DOD.  
Cost estimates such as the independent cost estimate (ICE) prepared by DOD 
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and the life-cycle cost estimate 
(LCCE), occasionally referred to as the “cradle to grave” estimate prepared by the service 
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component, estimate the costs for a program over its service life (DAU, 2006). Once 
final, the cost estimate is used in a program’s request for proposal (RFP) and eventually 
in the contract. Adjustments to the cost estimate can greatly alter budgets based on 
changes, such as quantity increases in the joint strike fighter (JSF), or quantity decreases 
in the EFV, and alternatively increases in service life of major end items in aircraft 
carriers.  
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPROGRAMMING ANALYSIS 
Before we analyze the Marine Corps’ effectiveness in reprogramming, it is 
important to first take a look at the bigger picture, mainly reprogramming from the 
perspective of the DOD as a whole vice one particular service. A breakdown of the 
defense department takes into account the magnitude to which military reprogramming 
takes place. It also provides a backstop to the main purpose of this thesis. 
1. DOD Reprogramming 
Within the 10-year period, the DOD has tallied 775 actions for a near $235 billion 
dollars (calculated nominally) in reprogramming actions calculated for the time period 
(Roum 2007, and OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b). Figure 7 highlights 
defense-reprogramming actions over the time period by internal and prior approval 
reprogramming. On average, a typical fiscal year had approximately 77.5 reprogramming 
actions. As previously mentioned defense budget authority levels were on the rise in 2005 
coming to a high in 2010, however reprogramming levels alternatively dropped 
considerably beginning in 2005. The drop in reprogramming levels may be related to or 
associated with PPBE modifications, acquisition reforms instituted by Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L) in the better business 
regime of initiatives, or coming off a height of defense spending in relation to Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Furthermore, both PA and 
IR actions were on a steady decline beginning in 2008. 
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Figure 7.  DOD Reprogramming Actions (after Roum 2007, and OUSD[C], 
2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
While fiscal year reprogramming actions in both PA and IR’s were decreasing 
over time, reprogramming transactions were relatively flat until FY 13 as shown in 
Figure 8. On average, reprogramming transactions totaled 942 per relative action. Again 
it is evident that while internal reprogramming transactions are decreasing, prior approval 
transactions are increasing over a period of time. 
 
Figure 8.  DOD Reprogramming Transactions (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
 42
Tables 4 and 5 provide a numerical approach to both PA and IR for the period 
under study. PA transactions in 2005 are approximately 6.6 transactions per action, while 
in 2011 they reach their highest level of roughly 24.0 transaction per PA action. Similar 
to PA transactions, IR transactions are at their lowest point of nearly 7.5 in 2005. IR 
transactions per unit are at their highest point in 2009 at just over 14 transactions per unit. 
IR per unit transactions are steadier over the course of the 10 years studied when 
compared to PA transactions. 
 
Table 4.   DOD Prior Approval Reprogramming Actions (after Roum 2007, 
and OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 




per PA Action 
2005 45 297 6.60 
2006 29 393 13.55 
2007 37 334 9.3 
2008 34 342 10.06 
2009 24 330 13.75 
2010 25 493 19.72 
2011 23 552 24.0 
2012 20 469 23.45 
2013 18 291 16.17 
2014 17 379 22.29 
Total 272 3880 14.26 
 
 
Table 5.   DOD Internal Reprogramming Actions (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 




per IR Action 
2005 117 781 7.44 
2006 58 602 10.38 
2007 52 596 11.46 
2008 57 733 12.86 
2009 35 492 14.06 
2010 44 560 12.73 
2011 37 419 11.32 
2012 41 551 13.44 
2013 31 393 12.68 
2014 31 323 10.42 
Total 503 5540 11.01 
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The rate at which reprogramming is conducted on a fiscal year basis in the form 
of numerical actions and transactions contribute greatly to the overall impression of 
reprogramming. Yet, the sheer notion of the relation of the true financial significance 
reprogramming plays in the role of execution in the PPBE process of funded dollars to 
that of the congressionally approved budget authority is a principal question that lingers. 
Figure 9 provides some answers to the dollar amounts associated with reprogramming 
actions. Figures list dollar values per FY in real (constant) values, using FY 14 as the 
base year. Fiscal years were filtered by both PAs and IRs and the columns of increases 
summed to a total value. DOD decreases will be addressed further in this chapter. 
 
Figure 9.  PA and IR DOD Reprogramming Dollar Value (after Roum 2007, 
and OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
Once again it is unmistakable that reprogrammed real dollars are trending 
downward. However, more noticeable and consistent with reprogramming actions in 
Figure 7, FY08 spikes to a high of over $55 billion, with FY 10 trailing behind at nearly 
$35 billion. On average, PA and IR values total $11.6 and $14.4 billion, respectively, 
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with an overall average of $26 billion. In nominal dollars the overall reprogrammed value 
averages to $23.5 billion. 
2. Characteristic of DOD Reprogramming Actions 
Over the course of analyzing the details of every reprograming transaction in the 
ten-year span, patterns and/or trends began to develop. Fiscal year actions were compiled 
of mostly monthly type actions. DOD typically submitted one compiled monthly action 
consisting of numerous transactions affecting all services. However, other types of 
actions followed and filled the void in places were a normal action submission was not 
appropriate or deadlines squandered. Table 6 lists only a few of the primary varieties of 
submissions typically associated in a given FY throughout the ten-year period, and 
includes their total number of actions submitted to the Congress for approval. 
 
Table 6.   Specialty Reprogramming Actions (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
PA Omnibus 1 1 2 1 1 1 4 2 - 2 15 
IR Omnibus - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 
PA MRAP - - 2 - 1 - - - - - 3 
IR MRAP - - - 5 4 7 4 6 2 - 28 
Environmental Restoration 4 3 2 4 3 5 4 2 3 3 33 
FCFCD 8 6 6 6 4 3 2 7 5 3 50 
Ship Costs 2 2 5 5 - 3 1 1 2 1 22 
IR Drug Interdiction 4 4 5 6 3 3 4 5 5 5 44 
MIP/Classified 6 7 8 6 8 8 9 12 5 9 78 
Natural Disasters 7 4 - 3 - 2 - - - 1 17 
 
 
Omnibus appropriations are immense bills that encompass many un-enacted 
appropriations (Brook, 2014). Omnibus reprogramming actions ensue as a result of 
previously approved appropriations because of three primary purposes. First, due to the 
special transfer authority provided in the omnibus bill, second a reprogramming 
transaction has fallen above the threshold amounts, and finally due to congressional 
special interest in a particular program. Omnibus PA actions occurred every fiscal year 
excluding 2013, while IR Omnibus actions occurred once in FY07. Table 7 provides the 
total number of transactions along with the monetary values (increases then decreases) 
that took place as a result of the Omnibus appropriations for the ten-year period, with 
dollars in constant (real) FY14 base year values. 
 
Table 7.   Omnibus Transactions (after Roum 2007, and OUSD[C], 2007-
2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 







2005 128 - 1,958/1,679 - 
2006 167 - - - 
2007 157 53 3,635/3,745 152/152 
2008 120 - 3,146/3,061 - 
2009 156 - 3,343/3,265 - 
2010 193 - 3,008/3,015 - 
2011 377 - 7,161/7,340 - 
2012 256 - 7,403/7,603 - 
2013 - - - - 
2014 207 - 4,073/4,028 - 
Total 1761 53 33,727/33,736 152/152 
(Increases/Decreases in $M) 
 
 
PA and IR MRAP refer to the actions submitted to Congress for procurement 
along with operations and maintenance of the MRAP and MATV. These types of 
reprogramming actions also funded the transportation of the MRAP and MATV to Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Table 8 provides monetary values (increases then decreases) that took 
place as a result of the purchase and operation of the MRAP for the ten-year period, in 
constant (real) FY 14 base year values. In order to source the program requirement of 
such a large program, DOD created a transfer account termed the Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected Vehicle Fund. Typically the MRAP fund transferred funding to the 
procurement and O&M appropriations accounts. Over the ten-year period DOD MRAP 




Table 8.   DOD MRAP Funds Reprogrammed (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
FY Prior Approval Internal Reprogramming
2005 - - 
2006 - - 
2007 1,685/1,685 - 
2008 - 19,693/19,693 
2009 100/100 6,244/6,244 
2010 - 12,561/12,561 
2011 - 3,873/3,873 
2012 - 2,746/2,746 
2013 - 656/656 
2014 - - 
Total 2,169/2,169 45,773/45,773 
(Increases/Decreases in $M) 
 
 
Reprogramming involving environmental restoration (ER) includes elements such 
as recycling and removal of hazardous materials; additionally funding the removal of 
retired infrastructure (Appropriations Act of Congress, 2008). The environmental 
restoration is a transfer account controlled by the DOD. Usually in the case of 
reprogramming ER transferred held funds to primarily the O&M major appropriation 
accounts of all the services. 
Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense (FCFD), also a transfer account managed 
by the DOD, occurs as a result of the rise or fall of the U.S. dollar as compared to the 
foreign currency exchange rates. The FCFD account is used as a balancing instrument for 
the purchase of foreign goods and services to the O&M and MILPERS major 
appropriations accounts (GAO, 1986b). 
Reprogramming actions classified as ship costs result from the procurement and 
sustainment of naval ships. Through the navy shipbuilding conversion fund, funds are 
shifted from various Navy and Marine Corps major appropriations. 
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Drug interdiction and counter drug actions regularly occurred as a consequence of 
the war on drugs not resulting directly in the U.S. but indirectly within overseas 
contingency operations (OCO). Typical appropriations affected were primarily reserve 
and National Guard MILPERS, O&M, and procurement. However, additional 
appropriations affected included defense-wide agencies such as the Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and Defense Security Service (DSS) 
to list a few. Also non-defense agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA), 
and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGIA) received funds from the drug 
interdiction and counter drug activities transfer fund. 
Military Intelligence Program (MIP) and classified programs reprogramming 
actions are considered two somewhat similar actions that typically affected various major 
appropriations across the DOD. Funds originated from various appropriations but 
primarily from transfer accounts such as the Iraqi Security Forces Fund and the military 
intelligence program transfer fund. 
Natural disaster reprogramming occurred as the name implies. Most funding 
originated from various appropriations internal to the service requiring additional 
funding. However, funding also initiated from transfer accounts such as the Overseas 
Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance, and Civic Aid fund. 
3. Reprogramming of Major Appropriations  
The total size of DOD reprogrammed dollars is informative but enhanced by 
separating the values into their major appropriations. The type of major defense 
appropriations that are reprogrammed internal to the defense department, over the period 
studied, can lead to a representative value of varying detail. In this instance overall DOD 
observations (transactions) throughout the fiscal years were summed excluding their 
monetary values. The complete trends in relative reprogramming observations within 
their respective appropriations were calculated as a percentage of total reprogramming 
observations separated by FY displayed in Table 9. The table then presents the accounts 
that required additional funding do to un-forecasted shortfalls or changes in priority. 
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Table 9.   Relative Value of Reprogramming Transactions (after Roum 2007, 
and OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 Appn/Fund AVG % 
MILPERS 12.1 13.6 8.5 8.6 9.7 10.5 12.3 10.1 16.2 17 11.6%
O&M 30.1 29.6 26.5 29.1 24.2 25.9 35.8 27.8 31.9 31.9 29.2%
Procurement 19.6 24 20.4 20.9 25.2 27 27.4 25.9 20 25.5 23.6%
RDT&E 14.7 13.5 20.2 19 22.5 20.9 15.7 18.1 11.3 13.2 17.1%
MILCON/ 






14.1 9.4 15.6 12.5 9.2 11.4 8.4 9.4 12.4 9.1 11.3
Non-DOD - - - - 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 - 0.6 0.1%
 
Transfer funds and other programs include all types of appropriations and transfer 
funds not associated with the five other categories. They include, but not limited to, 
accounts such as ship modification and conversion, contingency operations fund, 
revolving transfer funds, and other DOD programs. Non-DOD programs primarily such 
the Intelligence Community Management Account (ICMA) were categorized 
individually. 
Operations and Maintenance accounted for a majority of reprogramming through 
every fiscal year excluding both FY 09 and FY 10. O&M held an average of nearly 30 
percent of reprogramming transactions over the period. In fiscal years 09 and 10, 
procurement exceeded O&M by approximately one percentage point in total 
reprogramming transactions. Over the 10-year period, procurement averaged 23.6 
percent. Ranging from zero to 10 percent, military construction and military housing had 
the lowest portion of reprogrammed transactions. MILPERS had approximately 12 
percent of reprogramming transactions. 
4. DOD Statistics 
Department of Defense reprogramming descriptive statistics by fiscal years have 
been provided and broken-down into four categories, with each category containing the 
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same information. Prior approval increases and decreases along with internal 
reprogramming increases and decreases were included. Each set of descriptive statistics 
contain the number of PA or IR transactions, minimum, first quartile, median, third 
quartile, maximum, interquartile range, mean, standard deviation, coefficient of variation, 
and total dollar value. This data can be found in Appendix A. 
Represented in Figure 10 represents a graph showcasing the DOD’s average of 
reprogramming dollar values over the time period examined. The information is 
presented by fiscal year on the horizontal axis and dollar value in real millions of dollars 
on the vertical axis. The data is further broken down into prior approval, internal 
reprogramming, along with representative increases and decreases. 
 
Figure 10.  DOD Reprogrammed Mean (after Roum 2007, and OUSD[C], 2007-
2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
Once again the relatively high average levels of funding being moved from one 
program to another is evident in FY08 and FY10. Additionally the mean outlier 
represented in FY13 for PA increases equals just above $130 billion. Overall the average 
reprogramming levels vary from fiscal year to fiscal year. The 10-year average in real 
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dollars equates to approximately $58 billion, which includes both increases and 
decreases, and PA and IR averages. Separately, PA increases equal an average of $68 
billion, PA decreases equate to $58.4 billion, IR increases average $40.4 billion, and IR 
decrease average calculated $65 billion.  
The coefficient of variation (CV) measures the relative size of dispersion from the 
mean. The CV for DOD is presented in Figure 11, which is a bar graph showcasing the 
DOD’s CV for reprogramming over the course of the past decade. The information is 
split by fiscal year on the horizontal axis with CV on the vertical axis. In the case of 
constant (real) versus current (nominal) the CV is not affected. The data is further broken 
down into prior approval, internal reprogramming, along with representative increases 
and decreases. 
 
Figure 11.  DOD Coefficient of Variation (after Roum 2007, and OUSD[C], 
2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
Observing FY 08, the CV is high for all actions indicating large dispersion from 
the mean for all actions. Over the time period, the CV for PA increases is fairly constant 
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while the CV for IR decreases remained about 4.00 until FY 11 when it stabilized at 
about 2.00. After FY 10 the CV seems to stabilize for all reprogramming actions. 
5. Change in Congressional Base 
The change in the congressionally approved budget authority (base) relative to 
reprogramming in the respective FY provides further consistent information of a 
downward trend. An analysis of total reprogramming compared to the total budget 
authority could possibly provide a deeper aspect into the relative percentage of funding 
shifted within the DOD. Displayed in Figure 12, are the relative percentages of 
reprogramming by total budget authority (BA). Data is provided in both IR and PA 
giving their respective portion of the BA that is reprogrammed. For example, in FY 05, 
there were a total of $8.7 billion in PA increases reprogrammed. Given a total DOD 
budget authority of $483.8 billion, 1.8 percent of the DOD budget authority is 
reprogrammed under the category of prior approval in increases. Once we include the IR 
portion of reprogramming at 3.2 percent, the two PA and IR percentages are totaled 
receiving a total of 5.01 percent, implying that roughly 5 percent of the FY 05 budget was 
reprogrammed.  
 
Figure 12.  DOD Reprogramming Percentages of BA (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014a and b) 
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For a period in FY 05 to 06 and beginning again in FY 08 to FY 11 IR 
reprogramming exceeded PA reprogrammed funding. Overall, the average percentage of 
the BA reprogrammed under PA was calculated at 1.71 percent and IR calculated to 2.1 
percent. When combined within the time frame of 10 years, 3.8 percent of the total BA 
was reprogrammed, leaving 96.2 intact. It can then be stated that on average, DOD 
achieved a relatively successful budget and properly anticipated future events, given that 
less than 4 percent was reprogrammed over the time period. 
6. DOD Frequency 
To this point thus far we have analyzed reprogramming based only on the fiscal 
year. The frequency at which the DOD submits necessary reprogramming actions is a 
fundamental question that needs to be answered as timing may indeed lead to gathering 
necessary relevancies, which may be associated to possible key budgetary schedules 
and/or legislative and executive activities. It may also reveal distinctive occurrences 
across the DOD, other than usual budget execution occurring throughout the fiscal year, 
and the normal PPBE process for budget years that lay ahead. 
Typically, prior to the beginning of the first quarter of a fiscal year, Congress 
attempts to pass defense appropriations in the form of the regular appropriations process 
or through continuing resolutions until Congress and the President can agree on how to 
appropriately fund the defense of the nation. The continuing resolutions process allows 
the government to spend at the previous year levels or at specified levels. Often 
continuing resolutions run into the following quarter. 
Approximately halfway through the second quarter, January to March, the 
President is scheduled to submit his budget proposal for the upcoming fiscal year, 
primarily by the first Monday in February. Additionally, starting at the end of March and 
into the third quarter the executive branches mid-session review, also referred to as the 
midyear review, of the budget under execution is executed halfway through the execution 
of a budget year. This process provides an update to the current status of the existing 
fiscal year’s budget execution path, and if that path follows how it was originally planned 
and programmed, thus providing an opportunity to adjust where necessary. However, the 
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formal midyear review process is not the only review process in use. An additional 
informal process termed the triennial review process allows for other activities to review 
and analyze current budget execution. Through both review processes and along with 
continual reviews not on a typical schedule, obligation and expenditure rates can be 
assessed and adjusted as necessary. As the fiscal year draws to a close in the fourth 
quarter year-end closeout consumes almost every organization. During the final quarter 
obligation rates are ensured they meet planned rates and one-year appropriations are 
closed out if not adjusted and possibly extended (Potvin, 2011). Figure 13 provides the 
detailed comparison by quarter of actions, transactions and dollar value.  
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Figure 13.  DOD Reprogramming Frequency (after Roum 2007, and OUSD[C], 
2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
In the case of frequency prior approval and internal reprogramming data was 
again manipulated and categorized quarterly by each fiscal year. In order to view their 
comparisons or dissimilarities actions, transactions and current (real) FY14 total DOD 
dollar values are displayed. Labeling of quarters begins as follows: first quarter in blue, 
second quarter in red, third quarter in green, and fourth quarter in purple. 
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The charts confirm that actions and transactions with both PA and IR trend 
upward from a low in quarters one through high in the fourth quarters. First quarter levels 
gain little movement, second quarter is fairly constant, while the third quarters over the 
fiscal years are substantially erratic, and fourth quarter is also unstable but with overall 
greater levels. Quarterly PA dollar values also trend upward from lows in the first quarter 
to high in the third quarter. Alternatively, real IR dollar values stay moderately equivalent 
throughout the quarters while spikes occur in the first quarter of FY 2008 and second 
quarter 2010. Thus, the data exhibited in the graphs noticeably conveys tendencies for 
reprogramming to see elevated levels in the third and fourth quarters, possibly related to 
the mid-year review processes and year-end close out. 
7. DOD Overall Reprogramming  
An analysis of the DOD would not be complete unless we can have a conceptual 
grasp of the aspect into the component services from which the DOD is comprised. 
However, the information into a difference in services is limited in order to stay within 
the lateral limits of exclusively Marine Corps effectiveness. Figure 14 presents the 
individual service reprogramming by fiscal year in the horizontal axis and dollar values 
on the vertical axis. Fiscal year 08 is unmistakable high with the Army reprogramming 
$28 billion, nearly three times the amount of the next highest in service reprogramming. 
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Figure 14.  Total DOD Reprogramming Increases by Service (after Roum 2007, 
and OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
Figure 15 asserts the DOD’s performance in reprogramming displaying the 
overall 10-year reprogramming performance by service, calculated from the previous set 
of data. As revealed the Army’s portion of reprogramming within the DOD is nearly half 
at an average of just over an average 47 percent. The Army is followed loosely by 
defense-wide at just over an average 19 percent on adjustments and closely followed by 
the Air Force at nearly on average 18 percent. The Navy at an average just over 11 
percent and the Marine Corps encircle the backend of the DOD portion of 
reprogramming with the Marine Corps reprogramming only an average 4.6 percent of the 
total DOD reprogrammed dollars. In this case there is not a separable distinction of a 
downward trend as previously evaluated in other sections of this chapter. 
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Figure 15.  DOD Reprogramming Performance (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
C. MARINE CORPS REPROGRAMMING ANALYSIS 
Now that an analysis of the DOD has been offered, a deeper view into the details 
of Marine Corps reprogramming will now be presented. 
1. Marine Corps Reprogramming  
Referring exclusively to the years from 2005 through 2014 the Marine Corps has 
nearly $10.83 billion dollars (calculated nominally) in reprogramming of the five major 
appropriations controlled by the Marine Corps. A total that is relevant to only 4.6 percent, 
on average, of the total DOD funding reprogrammed. Total transactions are 494 
transactions. Figure 16 provides a breakdown of those 494 Marine Corps reprogramming 
transactions while providing both internal and prior approval reprogramming. On 
average, transactions were roughly 50 per FY.  
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Figure 16.  Marine Corps Reprogramming Transactions (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
While fiscal year average reprogramming transactions for PA and IR’s were 21.5 
and 27.9, respectively, overall reprogramming rose and fell over the decade with a slight 
downward trend. A specific low occurred most recently in FY13 decreasing to only an 
overall of 35; PA’s totaling 20 and IR’s totaling 15. FY 05 was the highest in 
reprogramming transactions with 71; PA’s totaling 20 and IR’s totaling 51. It is evident 
that while internal reprogramming transactions are decreasing prior approval transactions 
were increasing only slightly in the most recent fiscal years. The insignificant number of 
Marine Corps transactions occurring within submitted DOD actions to congressional 
service committees rounded up to an average of one transaction per DOD action for both 
PA and IR. 
The financial significance reprogramming plays in the Navy and Marine Corps is 
portrayed in Figure 17. The figure lists both the Navy and Marine Corps reprogrammed 
dollar values in real (constant) values in FY14 base year in millions. Fiscal years were 




Figure 17.  Department of the Navy Reprogrammed Dollar Values (after Roum 
2007, and OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
Marine Corps reprogrammed real dollars are on a downward trend and follow the 
path of the Navy’s reprogramming. As shown in the figure, Marine Corps reprogramming 
totals for the time period is $10.8 billion, while the Navy’s reprogrammed dollars cover a 
total of $29.2 billion. 
2. Reprogrammed Appropriations  
To assess reprogramming at the individual appropriation level, two separate 
charts of Marine Corps appropriations in real FY14 dollars are shown in Table 10. These 
five appropriations represent roughly 99 percent of appropriations that are 
reprogrammed. The five appropriations are then graphed. Each graph signifies both 
reprogramming increases and decreases; demonstrating the relative averages for increases 
(solid line) and decreases (broken line) of each appropriation. Each line represents the 
combination of both PA and IR actions/transactions. Unlike the DOD, Marine Corps 
reprogramming will be more prone to be represented in this manner due to the minimal 
fiscal year transactions submitted by or on behalf of the Marine Corps. For each 
appropriation particulars and above the mean values are listed below in detail.  
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Table 10.   Marine Corps Reprogrammed Values by Major Appropriation 
(after Roum 2007, and OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
Increases 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 




3.5 9.2 1.6 1.1 42.1 1.9 37.6 14.8 28.4 35.5 175.9 
O&M 83.1 348.2 12.1 490.0 427.1 644.9 819.1 716.0 9.8 13.8 3,563.0 
O&M Reserve 8.9 .9 .1 24.8 .1 .2 .3 .4 .2 .185 36.1 
Procurement 478.2 138.1 699.4 1,823.5 1,136 1,500.4 414.6 171.1 - 18.6 6,379.8 
Appn Total 1,366.3 1,045.2 713.5 2,407.1 1,668.5 2,332.1 1,546.0 1,011.0 49.5 165.9 12,306.3 
 
Decreases 




40.2 6.6 7.6 - - - 10.7 .6 .006 .21 65.9 
O&M 155.7 456.7 76.7 138.8 36.6 114.0 225.8 4.6 230.8 125.2 1,564.8 
O&M Reserve 23.1 3.9 3.8 - 2.9 1.8 1.1 .1 54.9 - 91.6 
Procurement 49.1 329.1 688.0 409.4 217.9 77.4 5.6 - 23.4 53 1,852.9 
Appn Total 999.4 1191.1 776.1 718.4 297.5 320.5 369.7 178.4 518.8 251 5,621.0 
Constant (Real) Values in Millions 
 
a. Military Personnel Marine Corps 
Following high levels in both FY 05 and 06 Figure 18 displays relatively average 
increase and decreases over the years examined. Mean increases held at $183 million, 
below the relative average level of decreases at $237 million, a difference of 
approximately $54 million.  
In FY 05 the Marine Corps submitted reprogramming action PA 5-05 increasing 
MILPERS for $264 million. The purpose was submitted as required to meet near term 
force protection and war related requirements. Funds within the MILPERS account 
affected only pay and allowances enlisted. The Marine Corps also indicates that funds 
must be returned within the third or fourth quarter and were returned in PA action FY 05-
35. Fluctuations in decreases of MILPERS in FY 05 were caused by transfers related to 
expired unobligated funds a basic repurposing (FY 05-111 IR, OUSD [C], 2005) and in 
most cases relative to their respective increase. 
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Figure 18.  USMC MILPERS Reprogramming (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
While fiscal year 2006 had levels above the 10-year average for MILPERS, no 
particular reprogramming transaction(s) in either increases or decreases stood out among 
the majority. FY 2006 MILPERS transactions were predominately funding level 
realignments.  
In FY 11 DOD submitted an Omnibus PA action increasing and decreasing 
various appropriations. The Marine Corps stipulates assorted increases in MILPERS are 
due to unanticipated low attrition rates, and improvement in operational tempo. Higher 
than anticipated officer and enlisted personnel remaining in the service longer than 
expected requiring increases in MILPERS appropriation. A fragment of the decreases, 
which funded the increases in MILPERS, came directly from enlisted subsistence due to 
unexpected increased mess hall collections and also from decreasing mess hall contracts 
(FY 11-21R PA, OUSD [C], 2011).  
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b. Reserve Personnel Marine Corps 
MILPERS reserves are displayed in Figure 19. The MILPERS reserve averages in 
reprogrammed increases were $17.5 million, which were above the relative mean 
decreases of $6.6 million, a difference of nearly $11 million.  
 
Figure 19.  USMC MILPERS Reserve Reprogramming (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
FY 2005 higher than average reprogrammed decrease was proportionately the 
result of an OIF deployment of reserve personnel. Funding was originally budgeted for 
reserve annual training and temporary additional duty purposes. Funds became available 
because no personnel were present (FY 05-38 PA, OUSD [C], 2005). The spike in FY 
2009 reprogrammed increases were primarily the result of one $36 million dollar 
transaction resulting from the improper reserve manpower projections in grade structure 
and end-strength (FY 09-29 PA, OUSD [C], 2009). The same underestimated reserve 
manpower in FY 2009 occurred again in fiscal years 2011, 2013, and 2014 however in 
different amounts (FY 11-21-R PA, OUSD [C], 2011), (FY 13-18 PA, OUSD [C], 2013), 
(FY 14-11 PA, OUSD [C], 2014).  
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c. Procurement Marine Corps 
The procurement graph in Figure 20 displays significant elevation in increase 
beginning in 2007 and falling to a level below the mean in 2011. Mean levels in increases 
held at $638 million, while relative mean levels for decreases were calculated at $185 
million, a difference of approximately $453 million.  
In March of 2007 DON submitted PA 07-08 for the procurement of 244 MRAPs 
for $427.9 million. This included $415.8 million in procurement Marine Corps and $12.1 
million in RDT&E Navy dollars. That same FY, DOD’s Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) supplemental request, as it became known, included $427.9 million for the 
procurement for the same 244 mine resistant ambush vehicles (MRAP). The 
reprogramming action was submitted ahead of the Navy’s submission of the FY 07 
GWOT supplemental request, a short-term solution, to guarantee funding was in place in 
order for the program to begin concurrently with congressional pressures. Also in the 
short term the Marine Corps would reduce funding in the following procurement 
programs: amphibious assault vehicle (AAVP7A1), product improvement program (PIP), 
blue force tracker (BFT), radio systems, high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle 
(HMMWV), medium tactical vehicle replacement (MTVR), and engineering equipment. 
Once funding was approved in the GWOT supplemental the Marine Corps would then 
submit another reprogramming action to return the funds to the six procurement programs 
(FY 07-08 PA). However no future reprogramming indicate funds were returned. 
The highest levels in procurement increases came in 2008, leading from DODs 
submission of $5.2 billion in reprogramming actions in order to continue the procurement 
of the MRAP program. Of the $5.2 billion, the Marine Corps would submit for $1.4 
billion in procurement dollars for the continued production, spares and contractor 
maintenance support for the MRAP. The funding would entirely originate from the Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected Fund controlled by the MRAP Joint Program Office (FY 08-
02 IR, OUSD [C], 2008). 
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Figure 20.  USMC Procurement Reprogramming (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
Increases in 2009 fell roughly $600 million principally from DODs submission of 
$3.0 billion in reprogramming actions in order to continue the procurement of the MRAP 
program. Of the $3.0 billion, the Marine Corps would submit for just over $1 billion for 
the procurement of MRAP all-terrain vehicle (MATV) furnished with improvised 
explosive devices (IED) jammers. The funding would entirely originate from the Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected Fund (FY 09-20 IR, OUSD [C], 2009). 
In 2010 DOD submitted $1.7 billion in reprogramming actions in order to 
continue the procurement of the MRAP program. Of the $1.7 billion, the Marine Corps 
would submit for $417 million in procurement dollars for the MRAP (FY 10-07 IR, 
OUSD [C], 2010). Later in the same fiscal year the Marine Corps would submit for an 
additionally $692 million in procurement dollars related to the MATV (FY 10-11 IR, 
OUSD [C], 2010). The funding would entirely originate from the Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected Fund. 
d. Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps 
The O&M chart, Figure 21, presents major fluctuations in reprogramming 
increases rising steadily from FY 2008 to 2011 with a slight decrease in FY 2009 and 
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again falling slightly in 2012. Decreases were not representative of their relative 
increases through the years analyzed. FY 2006 reprogramming decreases rose just above 
the average however; these mostly consisted of transactions realigning funds. Averages 
calculated over the 10 years totaled $356 million for increases and decreases at $162 
million, a difference of approximately $194.4 million.  
In FY 08 the Marine Corps, along with the rest of the services, submitted an IR 
action to increase O&M by $135 million due to the procurement of MRAPs, which 
included funding for items such as training, storage, and repairs for the MRAP (FY 08-02 
IR, OUSD [C], 2008). In addition, $169 million in O&M would be increased to fund the 
airlift of MRAPs into OEF and OIF (FY 08-10 IR, OUSD [C], 2008). Furthermore, 
another $120 million would be shifted to support the MRAP (FY 08-27 IR, OUSD [C], 
2008). Both IR funding would entirely originate from the Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected Fund. 
 
Figure 21.  USMC Operations and Maintenance Reprogramming (after Roum 
2007, and OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
In FY 09 the Marine Corps, along with the rest of the services, submitted an IR 
action to also increase O&M by $150 million in O&M due to the procurement of 
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MRAPs, which included the funding for the training, storage, and repairs of newly 
procured MRAPs (FY 09-01 IR, OUSD [C], 2009). Also due to the MRAP, an additional 
$158 million in O&M would be reprogrammed for the same reasons as in FY 08 (FY 09-
14 IR, OUSD [C], 2009). Both the IR funding would entirely originate from the Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected Fund. 
Related to the newly procured MRAP program, the DOD would submit more 
reprogramming increases in procurement dollars due to the MRAP with the MATV 
procurement in 2010 and the Marine Corps would reprogram $423 million in O&M funds 
related to the MRAP/MATV (FY 10-11 IR, OUSD [C], 2010). The IR funding would, as 
in the past FY, entirely originate from the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Fund. 
In FY 11 the Marine Corps submitted both IR and PA reprogramming actions that 
adjusted O&M increasing to just over $775 million. Within FY 11’s PA-Omnibus the 
Marine Corps increased O&M funds $150 million for the transportation and shipping of 
equipment and supplies in and out of Afghanistan (FY 11-21R PA, OUSD [C], 2011). 
Furthermore, due to the MRAP procurement an additional $231 million in O&M would 
be increased for both OEF and OIF (FY 11-01 IR, OUSD [C], 2011). Additionally due to 
the MRAP procurement $190 million in O&M would be increased for both OEF and OIF 
MRAP support and maintenance (FY 11-17 IR, OUSD [C], 2011). Both the IR funding 
would entirely originate from the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Fund. 
In FY 12 the Marine Corps submitted both IR and PA reprogramming actions that 
adjusted O&M increasing to just over $691 million. Within the one of two of the FY 12 
PA-Omnibus the Marine Corps increased O&M funds $105 million. Originally submitted 
for $140 million but eventually reduced OUSD(C) due to adjustments to balance to 
approved sources. Details in this Omnibus action would include (FY 12-18 PA, OUSD 
[C], 2012): 
 $65.0 million to enhance aviation operational readiness and sustainment. 
 All $23.0 million reduced, but was to support the Unit Deployment 
Program (UDP) into Australia as the Marine Corps increases engagement 
and training opportunities in the Pacific theater termed the “pivot to the 
pacific.”  
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 Originally $24 million but reduced to $17 million to provide fielding and 
sustainment funding for existing Enterprise Land Mobile Radios.  
 Originally $13 million but reduced to $7 million to fund labor, 
engineering, and land studies for the Okinawa and Iwakuni Strategic 
Management Master and Area Development Plans.  
 
In FY 12, due to the MRAP procurement, an additional $100 million and $148 
million in O&M would be increased for both OEF and OIF (respectively in FY 12-01 IR 
and FY 12-02 IR, OUSD [C], 2012). Additionally, due to the MRAP procurement, $100 
million and $130 million in O&M would be increased for both OEF and OIF MRAP 
support and maintenance (FY 12-10 IR and FY 12-11 IR, OUSD [C], 2012). All MRAP 
related IR increases in funding would originate from the Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected Fund. 
In FY 13 the Marine Corps, along with the DOD, submitted a PA action to reduce 
funding of various appropriation accounts due to the decline of defense spending in 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) due to lower spending rates relative to the 
redeployment of forces and retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan. For the Marine 
Corps it would reduce O&M by $222 million (FY 13-09 PA, OUSD [C], 2013).  
As an example of the uncontrollable external environment unrelated to national 
defense the DOD initiated an IR action in FY 13 to transfer various unobligated FY 11 
funds. These funds were meant to replenish the Defense Foreign Currency Fluctuations to 
its statutory limits due to the decline of the value of the U.S. dollar compared to foreign 
currency exchange rates. In the case of the Marine Corps O&M decreased $54 million in 
IR (FY 13-25 IR, OUSD [C], 2013). This type of IR action has relevance not only in FY 
13 but also throughout every fiscal year in relation to U.S. dollar decline. 
e. Operations and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve 
O&M Reserve average increase and decrease levels were comparatively 
equivalent through the years examined, as exhibited in Figure 22. Increase average were 
equal to $3.6 million, which were just below the relative mean level of decreases at $3.67 
million, a difference of approximately $69 thousand. O&M reserve began to fall to 
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average levels following a slight rise in decreases in FY 05. This was the result of $14 
million in updates to estimates due to the GWOT (FY 05-38 PA, OUSD [C], 2005). 
 
Figure 22.  Marine Corps O&M Reserve Reprogramming (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
Fiscal year 08 fluctuation above the mean can be pinpointed to a requested 
increase of approximately $33.7 million, however this was adjusted by OUSD (C) to 
approximately $22 million, with no equivalent decrease(s). Funds in this case were 
required for restoration and modernization of facilities in order to attain a balance 
between active duty and reserves (FY 08-31 PA, OUSD [C], 2008).  
f. Reprogrammed Appropriation Average 
Figures 23 and 24 display the five major Marine Corps appropriations 
reprogrammed over the ten-year period studied. Values were calculated using the 
increase values in Figure 23 and decrease averages in Figure 24. 
On average, procurement accounts for more than half of reprogrammed increases 
at 53 percent followed by O&M at 30 percent and MILPERS at 15 percent. Reserve 
appropriations have been typically low. 
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Figure 23.  Marine Corps 10-Yr Average Increases (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
Conversely, when decreases are examined, on average, active MILPERS 
surpasses both procurement and O&M. Decreases are those funding values that were 
reduced in order to finance another commitment other than originally planned. 
 
 
Figure 24.  Marine Corps 10-Yr Average Decreases (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
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To gain a better perspective in relation to reprogramming and budget authority, 
one more set of values will be required. Using Figure 3 in Chapter I, when we compare 
and contrast the averages of Marine Corps budget authority with reprogrammed dollars, 
varying results emerge. Table 11 lists the averages of the respective classifications. 
 
Table 11.   Comparative Averages of Budget Authority and Reprogramming 
(after Roum 2007, OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014a and b) 





MILPERS 41% 15% 39% 
O&M 29% 30% 27% 
Procurement 14% 53% 31% 
MILPERS R 2% 2% 1% 
O&M R 1% 0.6% 2% 
 
The top three major active duty appropriations of procurement, O&M, and 
MILPERS will be compared and contrasted due to both reserve appropriations stable and 
insignificant proportion. With respect to the average budget authority over the time 
period, the primary appropriation budgeted for within the Marine Corps was active duty 
MILPERS, and also sourced nearly 40 percent of reprogrammed requirement. However, 
over ten years covered, procurement requires a majority of additional funding via 
reprogramming, while only 14 percent of the average budget is allocated to procurement. 
Active duty MILPERS, the major appropriation sourcing a majority of the requirement is 
the predominantly budgeted appropriation, on average.  
3. Marine Corps Reprogramming Statistics 
Similar to the defense department reprogramming descriptive statistics, the 
Marine Corps descriptive statistics are presented by fiscal year. Both sets of descriptive 
statistics (increases and decreases) include the values for PA and IR transactions. Each 
set of descriptive statistics contain the number of increase or decrease transactions 
(observations), minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile, maximum, interquartile, 
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range, mean, standard deviation, coefficient of variation, and total dollar value. The 
reason for an alternate presentation of the data was due to the Marine Corps total 
reprogramming figures once analyzed, in most cases the limited amount of Marine Corps 
reprogramming produced insignificant statistical results. This data can be found in Table 
12, however certain portions of data are provided further in order for them to be fully 
displayed and examined. Unless otherwise noted, data has been presented in current 




















Table 12.   Marine Corps Reprogramming Statistics (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
 
USMC Reprogramming 2005 – 2014 
Current (Nominal) Dollar Values in Thousands 
Increases 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Transaction 
Quantity 40 35 16 25 28 37 49 34 16 22 
Min 28 79 10 15 0 0 0 0 0 12 
1st Quartile 1,600 590 111 1,000 457 218 750 487 96 204 
Median 4,780 3,950 1,278 8,048 4,694 12,900 10,000 9,597 489 1,014 
3rd Quartile 20,026 15,667 7,369 35,440 15,232 40,000 30,000 31,363 2,800 16,146 
Max 241,700 250,000 415,800 1,415,000 1,023,000 692,000 231,000 148,000 18,200 29,411 
Inter 
Quartile 18,426 15,077 7,258 34,440 14,775 39,782 29,250 30,876 2,704 15,942 
Range 241,672 249,921 415,790 1,414,985 1,023,000 692,000 231,000 148,000 18,200 29,399 
 
μ = Mean 21,352 25,233 38,670 85,964 53,928 58,462 29,881 28,669 3,047 7,544 
σ = Std Dev 43,492 59,012 106,232 280,542 193,282 139,572 50,904 40,831 5,223 10,295 
CV = σ/μ 2.04 2.34 2.75 3.26 3.58 2.39 1.7 1.42 1.71 1.36 
 
Total Value 
Increases 854,097 883,162 618,723 2,149,103 1,509,974 2,163,078 1,464,174 974,734 48,746 165,972 
Decreases 
Transaction 
Quantity 31 23 20 23 12 20 12 14 21 18 
Min 0 100 40 53 2,600 0 101 141 0 0 
1st Quartile 3,200 1,953 1,900 7,062 6,316 1,313 1,225 2,300 3,000 5,405 
Median 14,000 14,634 9,600 14,400 18,169 8,350 7,000 12,905 6,400 8,757 
3rd Quartile 23,361 39,574 22,675 30,000 31,525 18,175 30,750 20,000 28,000 15,662 
Max 264,595 250,000 205,800 133,000 60,433 75,000 186,754 26,710 222,000 93,700 
Inter 
Quartile 20,161 37,621 20,775 22,938 25,209 16,862 29,525 17,770 25,000 10,257 
Range 264,595 249,900 205,760 132,947 57,833 75,000 186,653 26,569 222,000 93,700 
 
μ = Mean 34,931 43,763 33,662 27,891 22,435 14,870 29,163 12,288 24,295 13,946 
σ = Std Dev 64,827 74,160 61,246 34,469 19,469 20,779 62,900 10,245 48,792 21,200 
CV = σ/μ 1.86 1.69 1.82 1.24 0.87 1.4 2.16 0.83 2.01 1.52 
 
Total Value 
Decreases 1,082,853 1,006,546 673,236 641,484 269,224 297,404 349,955 172,030 510,204 251,036 
 
FY 
Variation 228,756 123,384 54,513 1,507,619 1,240,750 1,865,674 1,114,219 802,704 461,458 85,064 
* PA and IR Combined 
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Figure 25 demonstrates the Marine Corps’ average reprogramming dollar values 
over the course of the decade. The information is split by fiscal year on the horizontal 
axis and real dollar values in millions on the vertical axis. The data is further broken 
down into total increases and total decreases each including both prior approval and 
internal reprogramming. 
 
Figure 25.  USMC Reprogrammed Mean (after Roum 2007, and OUSD[C], 
2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
The relatively high average levels of funding increases are evident in FY 08 
through FY 10. This result is more than likely due to the procurement of the MRAP and 
MATV. The overall Marine Corps 10-year average in real dollars equates to $33.95 
million, which includes both increases and decreases. The difference in the high and low 
mean for increases equals nearly $93.2 million and represented by the increases in FY 08 
with a low in FY 13, revealing a relatively unstable reprogramming average associated 
with FY 08 through FY 10. Similarly the difference in the high and low mean for 
decreases equals nearly $39.1 million. 
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The CVs for the Marine Corps are presented in Figure 26. The graph displays the 
fiscal year on the horizontal axis with CV on the vertical axis.  
 
Figure 26.  USMC Reprogrammed CV (after Roum 2007, and OUSD[C], 2007-
2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
Most notably are the increases over decreases and the upward trend in increases in 
CV from a low in FY05 of 2.04 to a high in FY09 of 3.58 and then descends to a rather 
stable level of dispersion in the remaining FYs. Overall the graph indicates a low 
dispersion, also stated as a low standard deviation from the mean.  
Reprogrammed decreases show CV levels that are more stable than increases. 
Over the time period the Marine Corps requested increase(s) in funding and decreased 
their own controlled major appropriations. Occasionally, the Marine Corps submitted 
increases with funding originating from either the Navy or from DOD controlled transfer 
accounts. This is not to state that this does not occur with the other services, nonetheless 
due to the Marine Corps share in DOD reprogramming this sort of funding origination is 
more evident. Finally, Figure 27 presents a correlation of DOD to Marine Corps 
reprogramming. Through FY 12, DOD and Marine Corps reprogramming behave 
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similarly. After FY 12 the correlation reverses with DOD reprogramming fairly constant 
while the Marine Corps reprogramming falls. 
 
Figure 27.  Correlation of DOD and USMC BA (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
The downward trend conceivably indicates increased effectiveness in defense 
budget execution due to improvements and adjustments to the PPBE system over the 





















A. SUMMARY  
Reprogramming is the process of modifying appropriated funds from their 
formerly budgeted purpose. It results from the unplanned and unforeseen events such as 
war and conflicts, natural disasters, adjustments in cost estimations, and adjustments in 
priorities. The ability to shift funds provides for the flexibility to revise current programs 
to be effective and better suited for higher priority occurrences. Reprogramming 
effectiveness can only be determined by a comprehensive examination of the data. 
Effectiveness would then conceivably be associated to decreased variability in dispersion. 
This thesis primary task was to understand the effectiveness of specifically the 
United States Marine Corps execution of reprogramming. This thesis encompassed a 
review of the past ten years (2005 to 2014) of Department of Defense (DOD) 
reprogramming eventually narrowing down to the Marine Corps. Comparisons were 
employed exercising both qualitative and quantitative approaches. Quantitative methods 
included descriptive statistics through the measures of central tendency, along with 
measures of dispersion, and frequency distributions. 
To answer the research questions, the thesis provided various themes. To address 
the research question, a literature review involving reprogramming over the past decades 
was accomplished. This was followed by the methods for quantitative and qualitative 
analysis. A succinct explanation of how the data was gathered and organized, along with 
a brief look into some of the possible reasons reprogramming occurs.  
The thesis continued first with a look into the DOD reprogramming performance 
and it was apparent that while internal reprogramming transactions decreased, prior 
approval transactions are increasing over the time period. It is unmistakable that 
reprogrammed real dollars are on a downward trend. On average, DOD PA and IR values 
total $11.6 and $14.4 billion, respectively, per fiscal year.  
Over the course of analyzing the details of every reprogramming transaction in 
the ten-year span, patterns or trends emerged and were analyzed. DOD typically 
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submitted one compiled monthly action consisting of numerous transactions affecting all 
services. However, other types of actions followed and filled the void in places where 
normal action submissions were not appropriate. The patterns of reprogramming action 
types consisted of Omnibus, MRAP, environmental restoration, defense foreign currency 
fluctuations, ship costs, drug interdiction, classified, and natural disasters. 
The type of major defense appropriations that are reprogrammed internal to the 
defense department, over the period studied, led to a representative value of varying 
detail. Operations and Maintenance accounted for a majority of reprogramming through 
almost every fiscal year. In only two fiscal years procurement exceeded O&M by 
approximately one percent. Procurement averaged about 23.6 percent of reprogramming 
over the 10 year time period. Ranging from zero to 10 percent, military construction and 
military housing held the least portion of reprogrammed dollars. However, we found that 
MILPERS was affected the least in FY07 and FY08. 
DOD statistical data showed erratic values. The 10-year mean in real dollars 
equated to approximately $58 billion, which included both increases and decreases, and 
PA and IR averages. Separately, PA increases equaled a mean of $68 billion, PA 
decreases has a mean of $58.4 billion, IR increases averaged $40.4 billion, and IR 
decreases averaged $65 billion. The CV for DOD over the course of the past decade 
signified increasing dispersion in each of the respective FY. Once again FY08 was an 
outlier with high CV in IR for both increases and decreases, displaying wide dispersion 
over the rest of the fiscal years. After FY10 and into FY11 the CV appeared to stabilize. 
B. DETERMINING MARINE CORPS EFFECTIVENESS  
From fiscal year 2005 to 2014, the presentation and analysis of the data displayed 
varying results answering the primary research question: The Marine Corps effectiveness 
of reprogramming actions in relation to the fiscally constrained budget was hypothesized 
through the Marine Corps reprogramming a totaled of $10.8 billion over the time period. 
The average number of Marine Corps reprogramming transactions for PA and IRs were 
21.5 and 27.9, respectively; overall reprogramming rose and fell over the decade with a 
slight downward trend. Noticeably Marine Corps reprogrammed real dollars are on the 
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downward trend. A comparative assessment of the reprogramming performance was 
presented across the services as displayed in Figure 15. The Marine Corps reprogrammed 
the least within the DOD reprogramming only an average 4.6 percent of the total DOD 
reprogrammed dollars.  
The primary research question was also addressed through the five major Marine 
Corps appropriations reprogrammed over the 10-year period studied were also presented. 
Major fluctuation in reprogrammed O&M and procurement could be attributed to the 
MRAP program. With respect to the average budget authority over the time period, the 
primary appropriation budgeted for within the Marine Corps was active duty MILPERS, 
and also sourced nearly 40 percent of reprogrammed requirement. However, over ten 
years covered, procurement required a majority of additional funding via reprogramming, 
while only 14 percent of the average budget is allocated to procurement. Active duty 
MILPERS, the major appropriation sourcing a majority of the requirement is the 
predominantly budgeted appropriation, on average.  
An analysis of the statistical data provided a means to view and examine the 
dispersion, magnitude, and frequency of Marine Corps reprogramming actions. The 
relatively high mean levels of funding increases were evident in FY 08 through FY 10. 
Overall the Marine Corps 10-year average in real dollars was $33.95 million. The 
difference in the high and low mean for increases equals nearly $93.2 million and 
represented by the increases in FY 08 with a low in FY 13, revealing a relatively unstable 
reprogramming average associated with FY 08 through FY 10.  
Most notably are the increases over decreases and the upward trend in increases in 
CV from a low in FY05 of 2.04 to a high in FY09 of 3.58 and then descends to a rather 
stable level of dispersion in the remaining FYs.  
Reprogrammed decreases demonstrated CV levels that were more stable than 
increases. Over the time period, the Marine Corps requested increase(s) in funding and 
decreased their own controlled major appropriations. Occasionally, the Marine Corps 
submitted increases with funding originating from either the Navy or from DOD 
controlled transfer accounts. This is not to state that this does not occur with the other 
 80
services, nonetheless due to the Marine Corps share in DOD reprogramming this sort of 
funding origination is more evident. Through FY 12, DOD and Marine Corps 
reprogramming behave similarly. After FY 12 the correlation reverses with DOD 
reprogramming fairly constant while the Marine Corps reprogramming falls. 
Two types of reprogramming variations occurred in the course of a fiscal year. 
The first, common variations occurred as a result of the common reprogramming action 
such as steady budget execution although still requiring small reprogramming variations 
from the mean. In the context of this thesis, common reprogramming can be considered 
as from the minimum up to no greater than the 75th percentile of recent reprogramming. 
Special variation occurs as a result of the special reprogramming event such as the 
Secretary of Defense special interest in the MRAP program. The special variation from 
the mean indicates relative high dollar value reprogramming requests. In the context of 
this thesis, special reprogramming is considered everything greater than the 75th 
percentile. Common reprogramming must be monitored while special reprogramming 
must be regulated through analysis and verification. 
The typically end result from a thorough analysis of the variation in a typical 
process is to set controls to minimize the size of the variation. Control of the size of the 
variation in reprogramming is fundamentally nonexistent. As a reminder, by definition 
reprogramming is a function of a planned and approved budget authority. It arises out of 
the unanticipated event that correlates to a higher priority than originally planned. Thus 
controlling variation, other than congressional oversight and approval, involves fictional 
regulation of future events. It can be postulated that the regulation of future events 
demand such elements as to prediction of the enemy’s next move (conflicts and war) and 
natural disasters, and finally to anticipate correct personnel demand along with existing 
and future equipment. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
While conducting this thesis a few areas for future research and analysis became 
evident. However it is recommended that data sources from the DOD or services be 
verified for access and obtained well in advance. 
 81
First, a study into below threshold reprogramming and letter reprogramming, 
categories of reprogramming not considered in this thesis may lend greater detail or 
replace a void in the data.  
A further breakdown of each of the services reprogramming actions could help 
solve varying differences from within the services. Especially with the limitation of blue 
in support of green (BISOG) reprogramming values associated with the Marine Corps 
and Navy. 
The change in the congressionally approved budget authority (base) relative to 
reprogramming in the respective FY provided further consistent information displaying a 
downward trend. An analysis of total reprogramming compared to the total budget 
authority could possibly provide a deeper aspect into the relative percentage of funding 
shifted within the DOD. Thus providing a method to establish future reprogramming 
trends ensuring reprogramming remains an effective tool in the execution of a defense 
budget. 
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APPENDIX A. DOD DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (AFTER ROUM 
2007, AND OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012A, 2013, 2014B) 
DOD Reprogramming 2005 – 2014 
Current (Nominal) Dollar Values in Thousands 
Prior Approval Increases 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Transaction Qnty 132 185 170 179 162 251 311 201 84 194 
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1st Quartile 7,123 3,370 2,450 4,300 6,250 2,848 1,751 3,766 3,579 3,579 
Median 20,706 15,000 15,900 19,200 19,875 11,858 12,720 13,494 20,988 15,000 
3rd Quartile 69,254 54,985 43,351 50,370 44,869 40,200 40,928 31,000 96,250 33,337 
Max  827,000 825,000 688,000 5,000,000 598,900 415,915 669,998 1,000,000 1,968,951 500,000 
Inter Quartile 62,131 51,615 40,901 46,070 38,619 37,352 39,177 27,234 92,671 29,758 
Range 827,200 825,000 688,000 5,000,000 598,900 415,915 669,998 1,000,000 1,968,951 500,000 
 
μ = Mean 66,319 61,121 51,495 106,888 46,760 34,911 37,215 55,058 125,148 39,984 
σ = Std Dev 115,639 115,864 103,328 484,548 83,071 57,043 72,196 133,304 297,939 78,109 
CV = σ/μ 1.74 1.9 2.01 4.53 1.78 1.63 1.94 2.42 2.38 1.95 
 
Total Value 
Increases PA 8,754,078 11,307,443 8,754,211 19,132,885 7,575,129 8,762,735 11,573,714 11,066,767 10,512,472 7,756,888 
Prior Approval Decreases
Transaction Qnty 164 201 175 171 172 252 249 270 213 187 
Min  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1st Quartile 3,000 2,787 1,598 3,691 4,124 2,059 0 2,063 3,000 2,899 
Median 12,756 12,779 10,000 19,500 14,060 9,860 6,295 10,000 14,000 11,400 
3rd Quartile 35,194 38,376 38,550 42,790 37,919 33,267 35,000 31,201 51,400 30,051 
Max 1,283,208 1,456,500 800,000 5,000,000 730,000 408,770 1,283,000 1,000,000 969,000 579,600 
Inter Quartile 32,194 35,589 36,952 39,099 33,795 31,208 35,000 29,138 48,400 27,152 
Range 1,283,208 1,456,500 800,000 5,000,000 730,000 408,770 1,283,000 1,000,000 969,000 579,600 
 
μ = Mean 51,857 54,690 49,798 111,929 43,996 34,512 47,163 41,539 52,725 41,161 
σ = Std Dev 128,463 145,579 110,437 496,783 90,429 62,732 134,635 111,070 115,807 90,131 
CV = σ/μ 2.48 2.66 2.22 4.44 2.06 1.82 2.85 2.67 2.2 2.19 
 
Total Value 
Decreases PA 8,504,492 11,484,828 8,714,691 19,139,885 7,575,379 8,697,135 11,743,471 11,215,534 11,230,382 7,697,023 
 
PA Variation (249,586) 177,385 (39,520) 7,000 250 (65,600) 169,757 148,767 717,910 (59,865) 
Internal Reprogramming Increases 
Transaction Qnty 505 381 338 417 305 333 295 374 254 226 
Min 20 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1st Quartile 1,384 900 1,000 1,186 1,162 1,324 813 463 382 395 
Median 5,000 4,490 3,871 70,565 3,988 6,000 4,152 3,385 2,741 2,264 
3rd Quartile 19,032 19,328 13,706 24,766 15,020 25,891 24,247 16,962 13,083 10,764 
Max 913,171 1,207,796 656,609 7,443,000 1,835,000 3914,000 1,071,153 511,955 969,000 414,720 
Inter Quartile 17,648 18,428 12,706 23,580 13,858 24,567 23,434 16,499 12,701 10,369 
Range 913,151 1,207,794 656,609 7,442,999 1,835,000 3,914,000 1,071,153 511,955 969,000 414,720 
 
μ = Mean 30,711 36,320 20,964 70,565 38,220 68,784 33,263 23,037 24,536 19,524 
σ = Std Dev 93,018 117,457 59,056 423,751 149,279 325,095 104,955 63,148 80,995 50,164 




15,508,978 1,383,022 7,085,801 29,425,746 11,657,173 22,905,086 9,812,473 8,615,677 6,232,085 4,412,380 
Internal Reprogramming Decreases 
Transaction Qnty 366 230 263 324 192 230 124 180 155 97 
Min 1 1 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 
1st Quartile 1,200 1,069 1,000 1,000 1,046 1,488 2,000 1,074 1,005 1,541 
Median 4,985 3,807 2,600 3,316 3,148 3,827 10,000 5,285 5,000 7,579 
3rd Quartile 22,822 20,000 8,253 15,250 9,625 21,346 71,890 35,061 25,341 39,895 
Max 1,810,000 3,148,686 787,582 9,200,000 3,000,000 3,914,000 1,581,153 793,913 582,106 598,704 
Inter Quartile 21,622 18,931 7,253 14,250 8,579 19,858 69,890 33,987 24,336 38,354 
Range 1,809,999 3,148,685 787,582 9,200,000 3,000,000 3,913,986 1,581,153 793,913 582,106 598,704 
 
μ = Mean 42,357 60,709 26,942 90,820 60,714 99,574 79,133 47,568 40,234 45,488 
σ = Std Dev 148,161 251,712 91,517 630,609 258,180 459,885 199,319 120,398 89,064 89,585 
CV = σ/μ 3.5 4.15 3.4 6.94 4.25 4.62 2.52 2.53 2.21 1.97 
 
Total Value 
Decreases IR 15,502,704 13,963,101 7,085,801 29,425,746 11,657,173 22,902,084 9,812,473 8,562,159 6,236,339 4,412,380 
 
IR Variation (6,274) 125,079 0 0 0 (3,002) 0 (53,518) 4,254 0 
 
Total Increases 24,263,056 25,145,465 15,840,012 45,558,631 19,232,302 31,667,821 21,386,187 19,682,444 16,744,557 12,169,268 
Total Decreases 24,007,196 25,447,929 15,800,492 48,565,631 19,232,552 31,599,219 21,555,944 19,777,693 17,466,721 12,109,403 
Total DOD 
Variation (255,860) 302,464 (39,520) 7,000 250 (68,602) 169,757 95,249 722,164 (59,865) 
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APPENDIX B. VARIATIONAL REPROGRAMMING (AFTER 










DOD-Wide 5,358 22% 11,505 47% (6,147) 
Army 10,951 45% 7,631 31% 3,320 
Navy 2,381 10% 1,495 6% 887 
Air Force 4,718 19% 2,558 11% 2,160 
Marines 854 4% 1,083 4% (229) 
FY Total 24,263 100% 24,272 100% (9) 
2006 
DOD-Wide 4,024 16% 12,854 51% (8,830) 
Army 13,087 52% 7,362 29% 5,726 
Navy 2,341 9% 1,803 7% 538 
Air Force 4,811 19% 2,422 10% 2,389 
Marines 883 4% 1,007 4% (123) 
FY Total 25,147 100% 25,448 100% (301) 
2007 
DOD-Wide 3,282 21% 6,185 39% (2,903) 
Army 7,350 46% 5,503 35% 1,847 
Navy 1,972 12% 1,437 9% 535 
Air Force 2,618 17% 2,002 13% 615 
Marines 619 4% 673 4% (55) 
FY Total 15,840 100% 15,800 100% 40 
2008 
DOD-Wide 7,002 14% 27,268 56% (20,226) 
Army 25,628 53% 10,707 22% 14,921 
Navy 5,815 12% 4,657 10% 1,158 
Air Force 7,965 16% 5,292 11% 2,673 
Marines 2,149 4% 641 1% 1,508 
FY Total 48,559 100% 48,566 100% (7) 
2009 
DOD-Wide 2,948 15% 9,923 52% (6,975) 
Army 9,998 51% 5,612 29% 4,167 
Navy 1,836 10% 1,082 6% 754 
Air Force 3,159 16% 2,338 12% 820 
Marines 1,510 8% 269 1% 1,241 
FY Total 19,232 100% 19,225 100% 8 
2010 
DOD-Wide 9,156 29% 20,599 65% (11,443) 
Army 14,400 45% 5,508 17% 8,891 
Navy 2,980 9% 1,978 6% 1,002 
Air Force 2,970 9% 3,217 10% (247) 
Marines 2,163 7% 297 1% 1,866 
FY Total 31,668 100% 31,599 100% 69 
2011 
DOD-Wide 3,626 17% 9,144 42% (5,518) 
Army 9,635 45% 7,728 36% 1,907 
Navy 2,436 11% 964 4% 1,473 
Air Force 4,224 20% 3,370 16% 854 
Marines 1,464 7% 350 2% 1,114 
FY Total 21,386 100% 21,556 100% (170) 
2012 
DOD-Wide 3,692 19% 10,831 55% (7,139) 
Army 7,691 39% 3,823 19% 3,868 
Navy 2,434 12% 1,804 9% 630 
Air Force 4,891 25% 3,147 16% 1,744 
Marines 975 5% 172 1% 803 
FY Total 19,682 100% 19,778 100% (95) 
2013 
DOD-Wide 3,654 22% 5,418 31% (1,763) 
Army 7,769 46% 6,557 38% 1,212 
Navy 1,693 10% 1,890 11% (197) 
Air Force 3,579 21% 3,091 18% 488 
Marines 49 0% 510 3% (461) 
FY Total 16,745 100% 17,467 100% (722) 
2014 
DOD-Wide 2,744 23% 4,038 33% (1,294) 
Army 3,910 32% 4,282 35% (372) 
Navy 2,692 22% 1,564 13% 1,128 
Air Force 2,658 22% 1,975 16% 683 
Marines 166 1% 251 2% (85) 
FY Total 12,169 100% 12,109 100% 60 
 
Total 234,691  235,819  (1,128) 
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APPENDIX C. PRIOR APPROVAL AND INTERNAL 
REPROGRAMMING DOD BREAKDOWN (AFTER ROUM 2007, 
AND OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012A, 2013, 2014B) 
 
 
Prior Approval 297 393 334 342 330 493 552 469 291 379 3880 388 88.615 0.228
Internal Reprogramming 871 602 596 733 492 560 419 551 393 323 5540 554 162.615 0.294
DoD Number Total 1168 995 930 1075 822 1053 971 1020 684 702 9420 942 159.697 0.170
Prior Approval 8.754 11.307 8.754 19.133 7.575 8.763 11.574 11.067 10.512 7.757 105.196 10.52 3.364 0.320
Internal Reprogramming 15.509 13.839 7.086 29.426 11.657 22.905 9.812 8.616 6.232 4.412 129.495 12.95 7.892 0.609
DoD Number Total 24.26 25.15 15.84 48.56 19.23 31.67 21.39 19.68 16.74 12.17 234.691 23.47 10.370 0.442
Prior Approval 41 43 84 65 70 95 126 115 64 81 784 78 27.945 0.356
Relative PA 14% 11% 25% 19% 21% 19% 23% 25% 22% 21%
Internal Reprogramming 281 198 225 278 149 165 156 209 140 95 1896 190 60.241 0.318
Relative IR 32% 33% 38% 38% 30% 29% 37% 38% 36% 29%
DoD Number Total 322 241 309 343 219 260 282 324 204 176 2680 268 57.065 0.213
Prior Approval 0.264 0.733 1.824 1.578 0.954 2.569 2.127 1.847 1.812 2.162 15.868 1.587 0.718 0.453
Internal Reprogramming 5.095 3.291 1.457 5.424 1.994 6.587 1.500 1.846 1.843 0.582 29.618 2.962 2.038 0.688
DoD Number Total 5.358 4.024 3.282 7.002 2.948 9.156 3.626 3.692 3.654 2.744 45.486 4.549 2.054 0.452
Prior Approval 108 184 119 110 111 140 163 112 77 111 1235 123.50 30.809 0.249
Relative PA 36% 47% 36% 32% 34% 28% 30% 24% 26% 29%
Internal Reprogramming 204 137 104 147 124 127 83 95 74 68 1163 116.30 40.923 0.352
Relative IR 23% 23% 17% 20% 25% 23% 20% 17% 19% 21%
Army Total 312 321 223 257 235 267 246 207 151 179 2398 436.00 53.586 0.123
Prior Approval 6.447 6.972 4.591 9.465 4.290 3.598 5.298 4.392 5.639 2.226 52.919 5.292 2.007 0.379
Internal Reprogramming 4.504 6.116 2.759 16.163 5.489 10.801 4.337 3.299 2.130 1.684 57.282 5.728 4.500 0.786
Army Total 10.951 13.087 7.350 25.628 9.780 14.400 9.635 7.691 7.769 3.910 110.201 20.037 5.946 0.297
Prior Approval 75 80 78 77 92 113 123 116 74 94 922 92.20 18.737 0.203
Relative PA 25% 20% 23% 23% 28% 23% 22% 25% 25% 25%
Internal Reprogramming 143 119 100 147 112 118 86 128 87 86 1126 112.60 22.717 0.202
Relative IR 16% 20% 17% 20% 23% 21% 21% 23% 22% 27%
Air Force Total 218 199 178 224 204 231 209 244 161 180 2048 204.80 25.969 0.127
Prior Approval 0.944 1.688 1.183 4.090 1.638 1.306 2.057 3.185 2.238 1.535 19.865 1.987 0.974 0.490
Internal Reprogramming 3.774 3.123 1.434 3.875 1.520 1.664 2.167 1.705 1.341 1.123 21.728 2.173 1.033 0.476
Air Force Total 4.718 4.811 2.617 7.965 3.159 2.970 4.224 4.891 3.579 2.658 41.593 4.159 1.604 0.386
Prior Approval 53 57 42 68 46 114 110 106 56 72 724 72.40 27.480 0.380
Relative PA 18% 15% 13% 20% 14% 23% 20% 23% 19% 19%
Internal Reprogramming 192 119 142 135 78 124 63 91 77 55 1076 107.60 42.558 0.396
Relative IR 22% 20% 24% 18% 16% 22% 15% 17% 20% 17%
Navy Total 245 176 184 203 124 238 173 197 133 127 1800 180.00 43.001 0.239
Prior Approval 0.621 1.077 0.695 3.882 0.652 1.013 1.466 1.397 0.787 1.685 13.276 1.328 0.971 0.731
Internal Reprogramming 1.761 1.263 1.276 1.933 1.185 1.967 0.971 1.037 0.906 1.006 13.304 1.330 0.406 0.305
Navy Total 2.381 2.341 1.972 5.815 1.836 2.980 2.436 2.434 1.693 2.692 26.580 2.658 1.175 0.442
Prior Approval 20 29 11 22 11 31 30 20 20 21 215 21.50 7.044 0.328
Relative PA 7% 7% 3% 6% 3% 6% 5% 4% 7% 6%
Internal Reprogramming 51 29 25 26 29 26 31 28 15 19 279 27.90 9.469 0.339
Relative IR 6% 5% 4% 4% 6% 5% 7% 5% 4% 6%
Marine Corps Total 71 58 36 48 40 57 61 48 35 40 494 49.40 12.020 0.243
Prior Approval 0.478 0.837 0.460 0.118 0.041 0.277 0.626 0.246 0.036 0.148 3.268 0.327 0.267 0.817
Internal Reprogramming 0.376 0.046 0.159 2.031 1.469 1.887 0.838 0.729 0.013 0.018 7.564 0.756 0.783 1.036
Marine Corps Total 0.854 0.883 0.619 2.149 1.510 2.163 1.464 0.975 0.049 0.166 10.832 1.083 0.735 0.678
Marine Corps
Entire DOD
Number of Reprogramming 
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APPENDIX D. FISCAL YEAR 2007 PRIOR APPROVAL 















APPENDIX E. DOD CURRENT (NOMINAL) GRAPHS AND 
CHARTS 
 
Figure 28.  Nominal - PA and IR DOD Reprogramming Dollar Value (after 
Roum 2007, and OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
 
 
Table 13.   Nominal – DOD Omnibus Transactions (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
FY PA Transactions 
IR 
Transactions 
PA Dollar Value 
($M) 
IR Dollar Value 
($M) 
2005 128 - 1,603/1,375 - 
2006 167 - - - 
2007 157 53 3,153/3,248 132/132 
2008 120 - 2,809/2,733 - 
2009 156 - 3,025/2,955 - 
2010 193 - 2,790/2,796 - 
2011 377 - 6,778/6,947 - 
2012 256 - 7,137/7,330 - 
2013 - - - - 
2014 207 - 4,073/4,028 - 













Table 14.   Nominal – DOD MRAP Transactions (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
FY Prior Approval Internal Reprogramming (
2005 - - 
2006 - - 
2007 1,685/1,685 - 
2008 - 17,582/17,582 
2009 100/100 5,651/5,651 
2010 - 11,650/11,650 
2011 - 3,666/3,666 
2012 - 2,647/2,647 
2013 - 645/645 
2014 - - 
Total 1,785/1,785 41,841/41,841 






Figure 29.  Nominal – DOD Reprogrammed Mean (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
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Figure 30.  Nominal – PA Monetary Values by Quarter (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
 
 
Figure 31.  Nominal – IR Monetary Values by Quarter (after Roum 2007, and 
OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
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Figure 32.  Nominal -Total DOD Reprogramming Increases by Service (after 












APPENDIX F. USMC CURRENT (NOMINAL) GRAPHS AND 
CHARTS 
 
Figure 33.  Nominal – DON Reprogramming Comparison (after Roum 2007, 
and OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
 
 
Table 15.   Nominal - Marine Corps Reprogrammed Values by Major 
Appropriation (after Roum 2007, and OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 
2013, 2014b) 
Increases 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
MILPERS 648.9 463.7 .164 60.5 57.3 171.3 260.6 104.8 11 97.9 1,876.3 
MILPERS Reserve 2.9 7.8 1.4 1.0 38.1 1.8 35.6 14.3 27.9 35.5 166.3 
O&M 68 294.2 10.5 437.5 386.5 598.1 775.3 690.3 9.6 13.8 3,283.8 
O&M Reserve 7.3 .8 .095 22.1 .095 .23 .3 .34 .2 .185 31.5 
Procurement 391.5 116.7 606.7 1,628 1,028 1,391.6 392.4 165 - 18.6 5,738.4 
Appn Total 1,118.6 883.2 618.7 2,149.1 1,510.0 2,163.0 1,464.2 974.7 48.7 165.9 11,096.4 
 
Decreases 
MILPERS 598.7 333.6 - 152 36.3 118.1 119.8 166.9 206.2 72.6 1,804.2 
MILPERS Reserve 32.9 5.6 6.6 - - - 10.1 .59 .003 .21 56.0 
O&M 127.5 385.9 66.5 123.9 33.1 105.7 213.7 4.4 227 125.2 1,413.0 
O&M Reserve 18.9 3.3 3.3 - 2.6 1.7 1 .14 54 - 84.9 
Procurement 40.2 278.1 596.8 365.5 197.2 71.8 5.3 - 23 53 1,630.9 
Appn Total 818.2 1006.5 673.2 641.4 269.2 297.3 350 172 510.2 251 4.988.9 





Figure 34.  Nominal - USMC Reprogrammed Mean (after Roum 2007, and 




Figure 35.  Nominal - Marine Corps MILPERS Reprogramming (after Roum 




Figure 36.  Nominal - Marine Corps MILPERS Reserve Reprogramming (after 
Roum 2007, and OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
 
 
Figure 37.  Nominal - Marine Corps Procurement Reprogramming (after Roum 
2007, and OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
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Figure 38.  Nominal - Marine Corps O&M Reprogramming (after Roum 2007, 
and OUSD[C], 2007-2011, 2012a, 2013, 2014b) 
 
 
Figure 39.  Nominal - Marine Corps O&M Reserve Reprogramming (after 
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